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Summary  findings
Ninety percent  ot  tih  diftrernccs  across countric\ in total  additional ettect ot contraceptive availability or tamily
fertilitv rates are accounted for solely by differences in  planning on fertiliny  quantitatively small and explains
women s reported  desired fertility. Using desired fertility  very little cross countrv *ariation. These empirical results
constructed from both retrospective and prospective  are consistent with theories in which fertility is
questions, together with instrumental  variables  determined by parent's choices about children within the
estimation, it is shown this strong result is not affected  social, educational, economic, and cultural environment
by either ex-post rationalization  of births nor the  parents, and especially women, face. They contradict
dependence of desired fertility on contraceptive access or  theories that assert a large causal role for expansion of
cost. Moreover,  despite the  obvious role of  contraception  in the ieduction  of fertility.
contraception  as a proximate determinant of fertility, the
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Data Appendex  82From  1950  to  1990,  population in  the  developing world  grew  at  historically
unprecedented rates, more than doubling to reach 4.2 billion.  By 2025, population in  the
developing  world is projected to exceed 7 billion (World Development Report, 1992).  Even
those skeptical  about the destructive  power of the population  bomb should be convinced  that the
political, economic,  and environmental  landscape  of the next century will be larg_ly  affected by
the speed of the demographic  transition  in developing  countries. 2 Policies which can accelerate
*or delay) this transition have been the focus of countless debates since 1798, when Malthus
warned that the "power of population" would someday overwhelm  the planet.
Since  mortality rates  have  and  are  continuing to  fall  rapidly  almost worldwide,
differences in  fertility are the  dominant determinant of the  evolution of population in  the
The views expressed in this paper are exclusively those of the author
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2  The debate about the population and economic performance relationship has a  long
history, Kelley (1988) and Birdsall (1988) are useful reviews.  The importance for population
growth for political balance is argued forcefully by Paul Kennedy in Preparing for the 21st
Century.  The links with the environment (updating many others) are  discussed by  Vice
President Al Gore in Earth in the Balance.developing  world.  Since there are large variations in fertility rates across countries (e.g. 6.4
in Kenya, 7.4 in Syria versus 3.1 in Argentina, 2.9 in Indonesia), and large movements in
fertility over time, is is reasonable  to expect social scientists  to be able to reach a consensus  on
the primary determinants  of fertility.
Yet two views on why fertility  varies appear commonly  in discussions  of family planning
policy.  T'he first, the  "family planning gap" view is  that high fertility is in  large part a
consequence  of inadequate  contraception  due to the inaccessibility  or high cost of contraceptive
services.  This places heavy emphasis  on the mechanistic  role of contraception  as a "direct" or
"proximate" determinant  of fertility.  A recent article by Robey, Rutstein, and Morris (1993)
reflects this common view in statements like; "Of all direct influences, the most important is
family planning," and "differences  in contraceptive  prevalence explain about 90 percent of the
variation in  fertility rates,"  and  "fertility levels have dropped most sharply where  family
planning  has increased most dramatically." They downplay the adage, development  is the best
contraceptive, contending instead  "that  although development and  social change create
conditions that  encourage small family  size,  contraceptives are  the  best  contraceptive."
According to  this view,  the provision or  subsidization of  contraceptive services offer the
possibility  of substantial  reductions  in fertility rates, independent  of broader development  trends.
The second, "desired  children" view, is that high fertility primarily  reflects desired  births
and that couples are roughly able to achieve their fertility targets.  This view is held by most
economists who have studied fertility behavior.  As Becker (1991) argues "major changes [in
fertility] have been  caused primarily by  other  changes in  the  demand for children"  and4
"improvements  in birth control methods  are mainly an induced response to other decreases in
demand for children, rather than an important  cause of the decreased demand."  In this view
men's and women's fertility choices, which are conditioned  and constrained by the social,
educational,  cultural and economic  conditions  they face, are the primary determinants  of actual
fertility.  In this view, improving objective conditions for women --  raising their income,
increasing  their education, encouraging  empowerment  -- is the only voluntary and sustainable
way to achieve the reductions  in fertility necessary to reduce population  growth.
The analysis in this paper demonstrates  that the "desired children" view of fertility is
valid.  Analyses  purporting  to demonstrate  the dominant  importance  of the provision of family
planning  are typically  based on analytical  errors.  Using data and statistical  techniques  that allow
us to isolate women's fertility  desires independent  of contraceptive  costs or access, we show  tnat
to a striking extent the answer to why actual fertility differs across countries is that desired
fertility differs.  In countries where fertility is high, women want more children.  "Excess" or
"unwanted"  fertility plays a minor role in explaining  fertility differences.  Moreover, the level
of contraceptive  use, measures  of contraceptive  availability  (such as "unmet need"), or family
planning effort, have little impact on fertility after controlling  for fertility desires.
These conclusions  are developed  in six sections. The first section makes a prima facie
case for the "desired children" view by showing that nearly all (roughly 90 percent) of the
differences  between countries  in actual fertility  are accounted  for solely  by differences  in desired
fertility.  The second section addresses the two most important objections to using reported5
desired fertility; the ex-post rationalization  of births and the influence  of contraceptive  cost or
availability on  reported desires.  These  two  problems are  surmounted, empirically and
econometrically.  Third,  data on  contraceptive prevalence is  used to  show that although
contraceptive use is an obvious proximate (or direct) determinant of  fertility and hence an
important  correlate of fertility, contraceptive  prevalence has no effect on excess fertility (or the
fraction  of unwanted  births)  and little independent  effect on fertility, after controlling  for fertility
desires.
The fourth section shows that in spite of the mechanistic  link between contraception  and
fertility, a  very  small influence of contraceptive access on  fertility levels is intuitive and
consistent within a choice based approach.  The decision to have another child is simply too
important and too costly for contraceptive costs to play a major role.  In economic terms,
fertility is inelastic with respect to contraceptive costs because contaceptive costs are such a
small  component of  the  childbearing costs.  The  fifth  section  assesses  historical and
contemporary  household  survey evidence  which supports  a finding  that contraceptive  access has
little effect on fertility levels.
The sixth section addresses three  strands of evidence often cited in  support of  the
importance of family planning and contraceptive  access;  the large reported "unmet need' for
contraception, cross country evidence on the importance  of family planning  efforts for ferdtliy,
the rapid recent changes in fertility, and the results of the deservedly famous family planning
experiment in Matlab, Bangladesh.  Each of these strands is able to show some statistically6
significant, independent, influence on fertility.  However, it is also shown that none of this
evidence refutes  the paper's two key contentions;  that fertility is quite unresponsive  to changes
in contraceptive  access (or family  planning effort) and that family planning explains very little
(at most five percent) of the large cross country differences  in fertility.
This analysis  indicates that the challenge  of reducing  fertility is the challenge  of reducing
women's fertility desires, not reducing -unwanted"  fertility. The key question is how much of
fertility desires are determined  by economic influences  Lnd how much by social and cultural
forces.  More importantly, how and when can government policy instruments effectively
influence  these underlying  fertility determinants? The roles and scope for policies for increased
female schooling,  improved maternal  and child health, larger economic  opportunities  and higher
social status for women are critical questions  left to future research.
Actual Fertility and Fertility Desires
The best evidence available  on total fertility rates (ITR)3 and on the desire for children
across countries  is women's responses  to questions  about  their ferdlity behavior  and their fertlity
preferences in household  surveys.  Such surveys  have been conducted  to date in a large numiber
of countries by the World Fertility Surveys (WFS) and the Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS) programs.  Using these three surveys indicators of fertility preferences have been
3  The total fertility rate is a synthetic  number  calculated  as the number of children  a woman
would have during her reproductive years at current age-specific  fertility rates.7
derived. The first  uses women's  responses  to a question  about  their ideal  number  of children  -
to conpute  the "average  ideal number  of children"  (AINC). A second measure  of fertility
preferences,  the "desired"  total  fertility  rate (DTFR),  recalculates  the total  fertillty  rate in each
country  from age specific  birth rates after subtracting  from the number  of actual  births those
prior births  that exceed  each woman's  reported  desired  family  size (Westoff,  1991). A third
approach  (Bongaarts,  1990)  calculates  the "wanted"  total  fertility  rate (WTFR)  by using  answers
to questions  about  women's  future  desire  for children  to classify  births  (or current  pregnancies)
as wanted or unwanted. 4
Table  A.  1 (in  the Data  Appendix)  presents  the following  data  for  the years  available  from
the country  WFS  and DHS  surveys  and the Westoff  (1991)  and Bongaarts  (1990)  papers:  actual
TFR, the average  ideal number  of children  (AINC),  the desired  total fertlity rate (DTFR),  and
the wanited  total Ifertility  rate (WTFR). Also  reported  (to be discussed  later)  are the fraction  of
births  that are wanted  from the Bongaarts  (1990)  calculations  and the fraction  of women  with
four living  children  who want no more  children  from  the WFS  and DHS surveys. There data
show  the enormous  differences  across  countries  in fertility. In our sample,  the range  of TlR
is over 6 births  per woman,  from  a high  of 8.5 in Yemen  in (1979)  a low of 2.2 in Thailand  (in
1987). The standard  deviation  of TFR is 1.5. In assessing  the impact  of various  measures  on
fertility  keeping  in mind this large range, and the large changes  in fertility  (of three to four
births  per woman)  the demographic  transition  involves  will be helpful.
I  The terminology  for 'desired' and "wanted"  stems  from Bongaarts,  1990  to distinguish
DTFR  based  on desired  family  size  and WTFR  based  on wanting  an additional  child. All three
are referred  to as measures  of fertility  desires,  in spite  of the potential  confusion.8
Even at a first glance  it is apparent  that high ferdlity countfies  generally  have high
desired  fertility. Figure 1 shows  the strong  and tight relationship  between  actual  ferdlity  and
the three measures  of fertility  desires. Cameroon's  actual  TFR in 1978  was 6.4, whereas  its
AINC  was  8, DTFR  was 6.1, and WTFR  was 6. In contrast,  Sri  Lanka's  TFR in 1987  was  2.6
while  AINC  was 3.1, DTFR  was  2.2 and WTFR  was 2.2. The differences  across  countries  in
desired  fertility  are very  much  larger  than  the differences  for  a given  country  between  actual  and
desired  fertility.
Table  1 reports  the results  of regressing  actual  fertility  on fertlity desires.  There  are two
striking  results. Ihe fr.cdon of cross-country  fertility  variation  explained  (the R-squared)  by
desires  is .92 for DTFR, .89 for WTFR,  and .65 for AINC. These  R 2are extremely  high for
cross-country  regressions  and imply  thac  90 percent  of the differences  in actual  fertility  levels
across  countries  are associated  with  differences  in desired  fertility.  High  ferdlity  is explained
almost  completely  by a high  desue for children.
5  The low R 2 of AINC  prmarily represents  measurement  error, discussed  below.Figure  1: Relationship  between  actual  fertility  and  three  measures  of  desired  fertility  for less  developed  countries
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Table I  Regressions  of the actual total fertility rate on three measures  of the desired fertility
rate for developed  countries
Average Ideal
_  _  _  _  j  Number  of Children  Desired Fertility  Wanted Fertility
Explanatory  Variable  (AINC)  Rate (DTFR)  Rate (WTFR)
Estimation Method*  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV
Coefficient  .79  .88  .93  .91  .95  .91
(Standard  Error)  (.074)  (0.82)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.63)  (0.67)
t test for a  =  0  10.7  10.6  ?5.5  21  15.1  12.6
t for H.#  =  1  2.72  1.37  1.92  2.06  .85  1.24
IS  2.65  .64  .92  .92  .89  .85
IV First Stage  --  .84  --  .77  - .84
R 2 2
Number of observations  64  64  57  57  42  42
*OLS:  Ordinary Least Squares, IV:  Instrumental  Variables (see discussion  in text).
Note:  Instruments  used in all three IV regressions  were fraction of women not wanting
more children with 2, 4, and 6 living children.
Second, the slopes of the regression lines are essentially one.  This implies that actual
fertility  increases  almost one-for-one  with desired fertility. The third row of Table 1 shows  tests
that the coefficient  is one.  In general, the hypothesis  that the best predictor of a country's actual
fertility rate is desired fertility (plus a constant) is not rejected.  Imposing the costraint that
desired fertility affects actual fertility exactly  one for one only lowers modestly  the regression's61
explanatory  power. 6
A second way to say that fertility rates reflect almost entirely desired fertility is by
examining  "excess fertility", defined here as the difference  between actual and desired fertility.
Excess fertility is neither systematically  related to the level of fertility (that is, it is not higher
for countries with higher fertility), nor is it an important  determinant  of total fertility. If actual
fertility were importantly  determined  by both fertility desires and by excess fertility, countries
with high fertility would not necessarily  have high Jesired fertility.  This would imply that the
explanatory  power of desired for actual fertility alone would be low and that the slope of the
regression of actual fertility on desired would be less than one.  In the limiting case in which
fertility desires were consta.it  across countries  and differences  in excess fertility were the only
factor determining  actual fertility, the slope and the R2 in the regressions in Table 1 would be
zero.  This is emphatically rejected by the data.
Women mean what they say
In order to claim that a one-to-one  and close relationship  across countries  between  desired
fertility and actual fertility implies that actual fertility is explained almost completely by the
desire for children, the question  of how accurately  these indicators identify  and measure fertility
6  To .603,  .900,  .844 for AINC, DTFR and WTFR respectively.  This is a heuristic
equivalent  to the t-tests reported in Table 1 of the null hypothesis  that the coefficient  equals one.12
desires must be addressed. 7 Taking women's reported reproductive  desires at face value is often
characterized as  naive and  two  major objections are  raised;  ex-post rationalization and
dependence  on contraceptive costs'.  First, a  woman's response to questions about desired
fertility are believed to be heavily influenced  by the woman's actual fertility. That is, women
do not like to admit that they have children they did not want and hence retrospective  questions
about fertility desires will be influenced  by ex-post rationalization. Second, women's reported
fertlity  desires  will  not  reflect only  child  desires  but  will  also  be  affected supply of
contraception, that is  knowledge, availability, or  cost of contraception itself would affect
reported desires. Hence desired fertlity could not be used to assess the effect of contraception.
In this section  we show these objections  do not affect the basic results. The availability
of measures of fertility desires based on both retrospective and prospective questions about
fertility allow us to use the combination  of data to solve both problems.  Since questions about
future fertility desires are unaffected  by ex-post rationalization  they can be used to solve the ex-
'  In fact, one reason these reports of fertility desires have not been previously  widely used
is the belief they have a large amount of error.  Lightbourne (1987b), for instance, points out
the close correlation of actual fertlity to preferences, "most  of the difference  in current fertility
is due to lower rates of wanted fertility" but concludes "the current fertility desires reported in
these surveys cannot be assumed to represent a solid floor that will halt the fertility declines.'
'  A minor objection in this context (but major in others) is that women's fertility desires
are unstable over time and hence dynamic stochastic modelling is required.  The reason this
problem is minor is that (except for AINC) we are addressing explaining  the current flen of
fertility in terms of the current flo  of fertility desires, not in terms of desired fertility stocks.
Hence, timing and instability problems that are very  serious in  household models, that of
explaining  current flows by desired stocks, are not relevant in this aggregate data.13
post rationalization problem.  Conversely, since retrospective questions about wantedness of
previous births are not affected by the contraceptive costs of preventing future births it is
independent  of contraceptive  costs.
Ex-post rationalization. The average ideal number of children (AINC)9  is simple and
intuitive, but has a number of serious drawbacks  as a proxy for desired reproductive behavior
and is the worse indicator of fertity  desires'°.  Some lead a woman's response to this question
to underestimate  desired fertility while others lead to an overestimate.  If a woman chooses
births to achieve a desired family size then child mortality will cause AINC to underestimate
desired fertility.  Also, as one cannot choose the gender of  children born,  strong gender
preference (either for boys, girls, or a particular mix of each) would  cause reported ideal family
size to be smaller than the number of desired births." 1 A final surveying problem is that in
countries where the desired nunber  of births is large, non-numerical  responses occur more
IThe  question asked of women with children in the DHS on which this indicator is based
was 'If  you could go back to the time you did not have any children and could choose exactly
the number of children to have in your whole life, how many would that be?'
10 One drawback  of all the measures, but which will not be discussed is that generally only
women are asked fertility questions.  Other research (Mason and Taj,  1987) has found that
husbands  typically  do not have systematically  larger family size preferences  than wives and that
actual family size usually falls somewhere  between husbands' and wives' preferences when they
differ.  For instance, in Kenya, AINC is 4.4  for all women (4.8 among married women) and
4.8 among husbands.
11 For instance, if women have an ideal family size of 3 but also want at least one boy the
average completed family size will be 3.25 and if they want one of each gender the average
completed family size will be 3.5.  These differences are larger than the absolute differences
between AINC and TFR in countries with low fertilty,  but this effect will be smaller at higher
levels of ideal family size.14
frequently, again leaving AINC as  an  underestimate of  desired births.' 2 Due  to  these
limitations  AINC is mainly used as a comparison  with the better measures; DTFR and WTFR.
A  second measure of  fertility preferences, the  desired total  fertility rate  (DTFR),
calculates a desired total fertility rate from desired family sizes by subtracting  from the number
of actual births those births which exceed each woman's reported desired family size (Westoff,
1988). A variant on this measure (Lightbourne,  1988)  also deletes births if they were reported
as unwanted" 3. Since there is a high degree of coherence between reports of desired family
size and declaration that a birth was unwanted if it exceeds this size, these two measures  are
very highly correlated (.98 for the 39 countries with both meassures).  DTFR is therefore
essentially retrospective as it is based on answers about wantedness  and excludes those past
births in excess of desired family size (even if not declared unwanted).  This is an improvement
on AINC, but may still underestimate  true desired fertility if gender preferences are strong.
Many demographers suggest that offsetting these tendencies for AINC or  DTFR to
underestimate  desired fertility is that women's responses  to questions  about fertility  preferences
are subject to psychological  ex-post rationalization,  that is, women will tend to deny that their
desired family size is smaller than their actual family size.  It is difficult to decide how serious
12  Yemen  is a good example because actual fertility is 8.9, AINC is 5.5 but 30 percent of
women respond the number is "up to Allah."  The average of numerical responses  is reported.
t3  Classification  as unwanted  is based on the following  question women were asked in the
DHS: "At the time you became pregnant  with [NAME  OF LAST  BIRTH] did you want to have
that child then, did you want to wait until later, or did you want no more children at all?"15
this issue is.'4 The fact often used as evidence of ex-post rationalization, that larger ideal
family  sizes are strongly  associated  with larger numbers of currently living children, is perfectly
consistent with women achieving exactly their desired family size.  Fortunately, we have two
solutions to  this  problem:  one  empirical, finding measures of  desired  fertility  free  of
rationalization  of prior births, and one econometric, using statistical techniques that overcome
the bias induced by this measurement  error.
Bongaarts' (1990) measure of  wanted fertility (WTFR) avoids the potential ex-post
rationalization in AINC and DTFR of reproductive preferences by producing a  measure of
desired fertility  and fraction  of births unwanted  based only on questions  about future desires, not
retrospective questions about past behavior.  Bongaarts uses the answer to the question of
whether a woman currently wants another child at some future time to classify the women's
previous births (or current pregnancies)  as wanted or unwanted,  If a woman currently wants
another child then the previous birth is classified as wanted.  This "want more" fertility rate
needs to be corrected to derive a  "wanted" fertility rate to account for the possibility that a
woman may currently want no more children as the most recent birth (or pregnancy) achieved
the desired family size and for the possibility  that some women may never achieve their desired
family size.  Bongaarts  uses the household  survey results from the WFS and DHS to make these
adjustments and calculate the "wanted" total fertility rate (WTFR) and the fraction of births
14  Women will, in  fact, report desired family sizes less than actual.  In Trinidad and
Tobago, 70 percent of women with 6+  children  report a lower ideal number of children, as do
72 percent of women with 6+  children in the Dominican  Republic.16
unwanted." 5 This measure should be free of ex-post rationalization  as it is based on whether
women want more children  given the most recent birth, not whether the most recent birth was
wanted.
The use of two different  measures,  one of which explicitly  attempts to correct for ex-post
rationalization, should avoid potentially spurious results due to  rationalization of unwanted
births.  Since the results in Table 1 are nearly identical for DTFR and WTFR"6  it cannot be
the case that simple  ex-post rationalization  substantially  affects  the present findings, as these two
measures  should then give different results.
Beyond the use of different empirical measures there is also an econometric solution.
Even if these indicators are observed with error there is a straightforward  econometric solution
to this problem - the use of instrumental  variables 17. An adequate instrument for the purpose
is a variable  that is correlated with the "true" desired fertility but free of ex-post rationalization.
In this case we have an excellent instrument because in addition to asking women about their
15 See the original Bongaarts  paper for the exact details  of the adjustment  from "want more"
to 'wanted" fertility rate.
16  In fact the coefficient  is slightly lower on DTFR than on WTFR.  The differences for
AINC for the OLS method (though  not for IV) are explained  below.
17  An  instrumental variables estimator can recover a  consistent estimate of  a  linear
regression  parameter  fl, where y  =  x4  +  e, even for a variable  (x) measured  with error  (for
example, the observed x  is x  =  x +  v where x is the true variable and v is an error) by
projecting the observed variable x' onto an instrument  (z) and using only that component of the
observed variable x  which lies in the space of z in the estimation of the parameters.  This
purges the effect of the error component  of the observed variable (x) on the estimation of the
relationship.17
ideal family size and wantedness  of previous children, the household surveys also ask women
if they want more children and these responses  are tabulated  by the number  of living children 18.
The final column of Table A. 1 (Data Appendix)  reports the fraction of women with 4 living
children who want no more children.  This varies greatly, from only 3 percent of women in
Cameroon and 3.2 percent in  CMte  d'Ivoire to  87.7 percent in Thailand and 89 percent in
Colombia.  Since these answers refer only  to  future desires for children they cannot be
contaminated  with ex-post rationalization.
Note that the instrument does not use the fraction of  women at various family sizes
(which would  be affected  by the frequency  of unwanted  births), only those  at a given family size
who want no  more children.  The fraction who want no  more at various family sizes is
correlated with desired fertility since the responses summarize the same distribution of desired
family size.19  Westoff (1990),has shown that the overall fraction of women wanting no more
children in a country has high predictive power for future fertility rates.
The instrumental  variables (IV) results strongly  confirm the ordinary least squares (OLS)
18  Included  in the "want no more" category are fecund  women who want no more and those
who are sterilized, but not those  that are infertile. Sterilized  women are included  on the grounds
that sterilization  is generally  voluntary and is prima facie evidence of wanting no more.  Some
of the surveys asked sterilized women if they wanted more.  In the surveys, the number of
sterilized  women with ex-post regrets (that  is, who now want more children) was typically  small.
19  Say the distribution  of women by their true desired number of children is represented by
a probability distribution  function f(n). The fraction  of women who want no more children who
now have N living children is cumulative distribution  F(n) up to size N, that is, the fraction of
women whose desired size is less than or  equal to  N.  These partial cumulants provide
information  about the mean desired fertility since they summarize the same distribution.18
results that actual and desired fertility move one-for-one.  In all cases, the point estimate on
desired fertility is approximately  .9, not overwhelmingly  different from one. 20 The explanatory
power is still very high with the IV estimates.
If  ex-post rationalization were  empirically a  major factor,  then  the  estimated IV
coefficient should be smaller than the OLS estimate. 2"  In fact, the IV coefficient estimate is
either greater (AINC) or roughly equal (DTFR and WTFR)I.  The fact that the coefficient
estimate is substantially  larger for AINC accords well with our intuition  that AINC is the worst
indicator of current desired fertility and suggests substantial random measurement error in
AINC, hence explaining  the low R-squared  in OLS.  Since the IV results are nearly identical
using instrumental variables for  all  three measures the econometrics suggest that ex-post
rationalization  is not an important  objection  to using these  country aggregate  measures  of fertility
desires.
20  Although  for DTFR the Ho:  =1 is rejected  at modest  significance  levels, mainly  because
of the very high precision.  The two standard error bound around the point estimate runs only
from .831 to .997.
21  Say the true model were that actual fertility responded to desired fertility, but only
weakly and the response to the question was the true desired fertility plus some fraction of the
excess of actual over desired. The OLS estimate of f would overestimate  the true coefficient.
On the other hand, pure random measurement  error would cause the OLS estimate to be biased
towards zero.  The IV estimate, on the other hand, would be consistent  in the presence of either
type of error.
2  A formal Hausman (1978)  test, which depends on the normalized  difference of the OLS
and IV coefficients, fails to reject that OLS is consistent (at least for DTFR and WTFR) while
rejecting that the OLS results with AINC are consistent, likely due to measurement error since
the OLS estimate is lower than IV.19
Dependence  of fertility desires on contraceptive  access.  Using these measures, fertility
desires to distinguish  between child desires and contraceptive supply needs to make a critical
assumption, that these responses  indicate what demand for children would be at zero price of
contraception23. Hence, the second objection to the use of fertility desires is that reported
desires might be determined  by contraceptive  access or costs.  If this were the case the use of
desired  fertility,  especially to  distinguish alternative explanations of  fertility  would  be
problematic.24 However, it  is  unlikely that the  results are  affected by  the  influence of
contraceptive access (or cost) on  women's responses for four reasons.  First,  the survey
questions themselves  are generally structured to avoid this dependence.  Second experimental
evidence on  changing contraceptive costs  suggests expressed desires  are  independent of
contraceptive access or  cost.  Third,  the use of retrospective data purged of desired show
answers measurement error avoids this contraceptive  costs problem, as past fertlity decisions
are unaffected by future contraceptive costs.  Fourth, the cost of contraception is too small
relative to the importance  of the decision to play a major role.
- In the demand and supply  for framework  for children one factor in the total demand for
children is the price of contraception,  which influences  child demand. By having a measure of
the quantity of children demanded  at zero price of contraception (referred to here as desired
fertility, not child demand)  we can identify  variation of this level as demand shifts and deviations
of actual fertility from this level as the effect of supply factors. The general approach to supply
and  demand for children is  sometimes generally referred to  as  the  "Easterlin synthesis"
(Easterlin, 1975), although this properly refers to a more specific set of hypotheses.
I  In economic  jargon, the following  discussion  about is the "identification"  problem. Since
the quantity consumed of any commodity  is determined  by both supply and demand factors it
is generally impossible to determine from observation of outcomes alone whether supply or
demand factors accounted for observed differences.  However, in this case, since demand for
children  at zero price of contraception  is well defined concept  (unlike  most economic  goods zero
price) we can use reported desires, if they are independent  of supply factors, to "identify" the
demand.20
There are two ways in which  contraceptive  access could influence  reported desires, either
women ignorant of contraception cannot answer such questions appropriately at all, or  the
number of desired children is in part determined  by the price of contraception  women face.
Do  women, even in developing countries, know enough to answer questions about
fertility desires?  One might argue that numerical answers are invalid because women are
innumerate or do not perceive fertility to be within the sphere of their conscious control.
However, WTFR is based only on a question about wanting another child, which does not
require numeracy nor a speculative  response about a desired lifetime total.  It is difficult to
argue that unedLcated  women, even in the absence of knowing  how to avoid childbirth, would
fail to understand that the question explicitly pre-supposed that it was possible.  People can
answer how tall they would like to be, even though they have no control over their height.
By the time of these surveys contraceptive  knowledge  was generally so widespread and
available that cross-country differences are unlikely to be a major factor affecting reported
fertility desires, even in  high  fertility countries.  According to  WFS and  DHS  surveys,
knowledge  of a modem contraceptive  method was very high.  For example, in Kenya in 1989,
TFR was 6.4 yet 91 percent knew of a modem method; in Jordan in 1990, TFR was 5.6 yet 99
percent knew a modem method, in Ghana in  1988 TFR was 6.4 yet 76 percent khiew  of a
modern method.  Moreover, even where contraceptive  knowledge is not widespread it is easy
to argue that the causation runs from a low desire to regulate fertility to low knowledge of
contraception, not vice versa.  Particularly  striking in this regard is the fact that in many high21
fertility countries more women know of modern than traditional methods.  Among married
women in Ghana, 64 percent know of the pill, but only 33 percent know of withdrawal.  In
Kenya, 91 percent know of the pill but only 51 percent of withdrawal. Even in Nigeria, where
knowledge  of any method  was only 44 percent, 41 percent knew of a modem method while only
24 percent knew of a traditional  method. The fraction  of women actually using the pill in these
three countries  is 1.9, 5.2, and 1.2 percent respectively, even with this widespread knowledge.
Both this low use in spite of extensive awareness of modem methods and that knowledge of
modem methods  is much higher than knowledge  of easy to discover, but not advertised, do-it-
yourself methods&  suggests that modern contraceptive knowledge has actually run far ahead
of desires to limit fertility.
The questions elicit demand for children at zero contraceptive costs.  The questions in
the DHS survey about the desired number of children (for woman with children) was 'If  you
could go back to the time you did not have any more children and choose exactly the number
of children to have in your whole life, how many would that be?'  The phras  'if  you could
choose exactly" is an attempt to eliminate  the cost or difficult of actually effecting the choice.
Also questions  about whether  a prior birth was wanted  are independent  of costs of contraception.
Only questions about future ferdlity desires are potentially  affected by contraceptive  costs.
Secondly, the  strongest  experimental evidence that  reported  ferdlity  desires  are
independent  of contaceptive costs is from Family Planning  and Health Services  Project (FPHSP)
23 After all, Coitus  interruptus  has been known at least since the time of Onan.22
in  the  Matlab region of  Bangladesh.  The  experiment saturated a  treatment  area  with
contraceptive  knowledge  and availability,  with trained female family planning  workers visiting
every household  every two weeks with messages  and supplies, while a comparison  area was (as
best as possible)  left alone.  From 1975 to 1990, the self-reported  "ideal family size" fell from
4.4 to 3.1 in the treatment  area, and by exactly the same  amount, 4.5 to 3.2, in the comparison
area  (Koenig and  others,  1992) even though contraceptive knowiedge and use  increased
dramatically  as contraceptive  costs fell in the treatment area.
The third reason why reported fertility desires appear to be independent  of contraception
costs is that the three fertility measures  of wanted  fertility largely agree (the correlations  across
countries are above .9)26  and the results presented above are broadly the same with each.
Therefore,  arguing that  these desired  measures  are seriously  affected  by systematic  incorporation
of contraception  costs into expressed desire must argue that this is equally true of each measure
(and of reported unwanted  births), which, given the different  reference timing and structures of
the question, seems highly implausible.  Moreover, given our results in the previous section
showing the  DTFR was not compromised by ex-post rationalization allows us to  use the
retrospective data of  DTFR as  an  instrumental variable to  purge prospective fertility of
contraceptive costs.  Doing so rauL  the WTFR coefficient  to  .96 - indistinguishable  from
one"  - and leaves the basic results unchanged.
'  The uivariate  correlations  are:  AINC and DTFR .956, AINC and WTFR .923  ,i DTFR
and WTFR .974.
'7  The overlapping sample  for DTFR and WTFR is slightly different from that in table 1,
the OLS coefficient  on WTFR is .91 in the smaller sample.
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Fourth, it is unlikely  that desired fertility is importantly  affected by contraceptive  costs
simply  because the costs are small relative to other factors in the decision.  We will return to
this in the fourth section.
Excess Fertility. Total Fertility, and Contraceptive  Prevalence
Since actual fertility can be explained  almost completely  by fertility desires, which are
independent  of contraceptive  availability  or cost, these results place a tight upper bound on the
importance  for fertility  of factors which  affect the difference  between desired and actual fertility
without changing  desires.  Even if all of the cross-country  variation in fertility not explained  by
desires were attributable  to contraceptive  access (which  would be extraordinary indeed, leaving
no room to gender  preference, measurement  error, etc.), it would  account  for atMQs  10 percent
of cross-country  fertlity differences.
What then is the role of availability  of cheap, effective contraception in determining
fertlity?  Is it not obvious that contraception  is an important factor in ferdlity?  After all, the
probability of  pregnancy can  be defined as  the  frequency of  coitus times the  chance of
conception  per coital act.  Therefore, a reduction in fertility must be due to either a reduction
in coital frequency  or a decrease in the probability  of conceiving  per coital act, and certainly one
important  determinant of the latter probability is the effectiveness  of contraception.
But there is a clear and important distinction between contraception as  a proximate24
determinant of  fertility and contraceptive access as  an independent, causal determinant of
fertility.  Indeed, the present cross-country  evidence shows (as many others have found) that
contraceptive prevalence (the fraction of women of reproductive age using contraception) is
strongly negatively  correlated with fertility. However, this empirical fact could be the result of
any one of three mechanisms;  increased contraceptive availability affects desired fertility,
increased  contraceptive  availability  leads to lower fertility  because the gap between desired and
actual fertility  is lower, or changes  in fertility  desires lead to changes  in contraceptive  prevalence
as  people use  more contraception to  achieve their  fertility targets.  In  all  three  cases,
contraception  is a proximate fertility determinant. But access to contraception  in the first two
cases would also be an independent,  causal determinant. As the previous section ruled out the
first possibility  this section will examine the possibility that contraceptive  access lowers fertility
by lowering the gap between desired and actual fertility.
Since actual fertility increases roughly one-for-one  with &dsired  fertility the difference
between actual and desired fertility is a relatively good measure of  "excess fertility."  By
combining  the three derived measures  of excess fertility  (IFR-AINC, TFR-DTFR,  TFR-WTFR)
with the fraction  of births that are unwanted,  we have four semi-independent  indicators  of excess
fertility. 2 8
Actual use of contraception  depends  on both the demand  and the supply, so contraceptive
28  The fraction unwanted is  not self-reported but calculated by Bongaarts and is  not
independent  of WTFR, it largely agrees with reported unwantedness.25
prevalence is not, by itself, an indicator of contraceptive  access.  However, if it were the case
that cheaper  or more widely  available  contraception  led to substantially  less excess fertility then
one would expect the absolute amount by which fertility targets were missed would decrease
with contraceptive  prevalence. This is clearly not the case.  Table 2 regresses each of the four
measures  of excess fertility on both total and modem contraceptive  prevalence (CPV) reported
in the WFS and DHS surveys. There is no statistically  or practically significant, negative effect
of CPV on the magnitude  of excess fertility.
Intriguingly, independent  data on the percentage of pregnancies or births self-reported
as unwanted  shows that the fraction of fertility that is unwanted is higher in many developed,
low fertility countries (for example, France 16, United States 10, Hungary 14, Finland 10
percent United Nations 1987) than in many poor, high fertility, countries (for example, Ghana
4.2, Uganda 4.6, Sudan 3.8, Pakistan 13 percent).  In our sample the fraction of fertility that
is excess  or unwanted  is not strongly  positively  correlated  with  the level  of fertility. The highest
fraction  of wanted  births by the Bongaarts  measure  are in high fertlity countries  like Senegal
(TFR  of 6.6, 91 percent  wanted)  and Cameroon  (TFR  of 6.4, 94 percent  wanted). The fraction
of unwanted  births actually  increases  with contraceptive  prevalence. The data, moreover,
suggests  the percentage  of fertility  that is excess  actually  increases  with contraceptive  useP.
I  If the regressions  were  run in percentage  deviations  for the other  excess  fertility  measures
(that  is, the dependent  variable  were OJT1-TFR)/TFR,  where  TFR is desired)  then the sign  on
contraceptive  prevalence  is (except  for AINC)  positive  and statistically  quite significant  so that
percentage  excess fertility  increases  with contraceptive  prevalence. This probably  is just an
artifact  of the fact that it is harder  to hit lower  ferdlity  targets  because  more  years of effective
protection  are needed. If the absolute  deviation  is invariant  with respect  to CPV the percentage
deviation  is inverse.26
Table 2  Relationship  between  contraceptive  prevalence (CPV) and excess fertility
Total Contraceptive  Modem Contraceptive  N
Prevalence  Prevalence
Coefficient  R2  Coefficient  R2
Dependent  Variable  (t)  (t)
TFR - Average ideal  -.005  .013  -.0078  .022  71
family size  (.94)  (1.24)
TFR - Desired TFR  .003  .016  .0017  .004  65
(1.02)  (.50)
TFR - Wanted  TFR  -.0005  .000  ;0004  .000  47
(.13)  (.08)
Fraction of births  .002  .153  .0025  .172  47
unwanted  (2.85)  (3.05)
Figure 2 illustrates the correlations between TFR,  CPV and desired fertility (DTFR).
CPV is strongly  negatively related to actual fertility (the R-squared  is .72 in this sample). But
CPV is also strongly negatively related to desired fertility, even though DTFR is independent
of access.  Moreover, CPV has no relation at all with excess fertility (the difference of actual
and desired).  The data are inconsistent with higher CPV lending to lower absolute (or
percentage)  excess fertility.Figure  2: Relationship  between  contraceptive  prevalence  and  actual,  desired,
and  excess  fertility
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If,  instead of  excess  fertility, we  regress  the  TFR  on  fertility  desires  and  add
contraceptive  prevalence,  we can ask what  additional  explanatory  power contraceptive  prevalence
gives over and above desired fertlity3.  Table 3 shows the magnitude  of the impact of CPV,
although  statistically  significant,  is extremely  small. An exogenous  10 percentage  point increase
in modem contraceptive  prevalence,  holding  desires (DTFR) fixed would reduce actual fertility
only by .17.
In a 1977 survey, Haiti's desired fertility was 4.3,  while modern CPV was only 4.7
percent; whereas  Zimbabwe's  desired fertility  was also 4.3 (in 1989),  but modemn  CPV was 36.2
percent. If somehow  Haiti's modem CPV could be raised to Zimbabwe's level, holding desires
constant, by how much  would fertility fall? The regression  estimates  suggest  that this extremely
large, eight-fold, expansion in CPV would reduce fertility by only about .5,  half a birth per
woman's lifetime, just  10 percent.  This small simulated effect the regresion  estimates is
plausible, as fertility in Haiti was actually only about .4 of a birth higher than Zimbabwe's
fertility (TFR of 5.6 versus 5.2), despite the large difference in modern contraceptive  use.
30  This is more fair to contraceptive  prevalence  as the regressions in Table 3 impose than
the coefficient  on desired fertility is one.  The incremental  R2 is still appropriate, given the
identification  assumption  (discussed  extensively  above), that  contaceptive supply  does not affect
reported fertility desires.29
Table 3:  Regressions  of actual  fertiUty  rate on measures  of desired  fertility
and contraceptive  precedence  or family  planning  offset
With  and without  With and without  Family
Contraceptive  Prevalence  Planning  Effort
DTFR  WTFR  DTFR  W`TFR
Desired  or Wanted  .894  .742  .912  .772  .877  .802  .887  .753
Fertility  (25.3)  (13.5)  (16.07)  (0.55)  (25.8)  (16.99)  (16.11)  (11.7)
Modem  Contraceptive  -.017  -.014
Prevalence  (3.41)  (1.94)  l
Family  Planning  -.007  -.012
Effort  (2.21)  (3.31)
R2  .910  .925  .852  .863  .914  .920  .855  .885
(Unadjusted)  I.I  lI  I  I_I_I
N  65  65  47  47  65  65  46  46
Note: AUl  regressions  are OLS. Absolute  values  of t-statistics  are in parenthesis.
This small estimated  impact is in sharp contrast to common  statements  like "a 15
[percentage  point]  increase  in the of contraception  prevalence  decreases  fertility  by nearby  one
child per woman' (Family Health International,  1990).  Actually, the numbers behind the
different  statements  agree,  just the cause  and effect  are exactly  reversed. The simple  bivariate
relationship  between  TFR and modem CPV does indeed suggest  that increasing  CPV by 15
percentage  points would  reduce TFR by about a birth per woman (e.g.  15*(-.071)=1.063'.
31  Fifteen percentage points is quite a  large increase, the average modem CPV for
developing  countries  (in this sample,  which  includes  various  dates)  is only 23 percent,  and the
standard  deviation  is 17 percent.30
However, using  the estimates  of the DTFR-modern  CPV relationship  in reverse we find a 1  birth
per woman decline in DTFR would cause about a 15 percentage point increase  in modem CPV
(e.g. (1/-0.073)= 13.7) 32.  But a 15 percentage  point increase in modern CPV holding desired
fertility constant (for instance  would be caused by a shift in contraceptive  access) leads to only
a decline  in TFR of only .25 births (e.g. .017*  15  =.25).  Failing to account for the cause of the
shift in CPV in bivariate relationships  leads to an overestimate of the independent  effect of
contraception  by multiple of at least four.  Nothing useful at all can be inferred from a strong
cross sectional relationship between contraceptive use and fertility alone about the effect of
expanding access on fertility.
Although CPV is an important  proximate  (or direct) determinant  of fertility rates, after
controlling for variations in desired fertility contraceptive  prevalence has an empirically small
effect and explains only 1-2 percent of cross-country  fertility variation.  When modern (total)
CPV is added to the fertility regression the (unadjusted)  RI increases by only .015 (.011) with
DTFR and .011 (.022) with WTFR.  Variations  of CPV explain at most 2 percent of fertility
variations,  after controlling  for desires. Contraception  is not important  as a caual or ind  ndent
determinant of fertility.  Contraceptive  use is higher where fertility is lower primarily because
desired fertility is lower, which leads to both lower fertility and higher contraceptive demand
and hence use.
32  These numbers are slightly different than those in figure 2 because this uses modem
CPV, while the figure uses total CPV.  The numbers for modern CPV are larger than for total
CPV.31
Prevalence  does not measure  access. Some have  gone beyond prevalence and argued for
the important  role of contraceptive  access and a large influence of family planning on fertility
using quantitative  subjective  indicators  of the strength  of country's family  planning  effort (FPE)
developed  by Lapham and Maudlin (Lapham and Maudlin, 1984). They rate numerically the
strength  of each countries family planning  program along thirty different dimensions, including
several dimensions  of contraceptive  access.  These FPE indicators have been used in empirical
work to assess the impact  of family planning  programs on fertility. Robey, et al (1993) cite this
research as proving "independently  of the effect of social and economic changes - family
planning played a  significant role in  reducing fertility .... "  Many believe "Lapham  and
Maudlin's analysis shows that ....  the independent  effect of program effort is somewhat  greater
than  that  of  socioeconomic development" (editorial  in  International  Family  Planning
Perspectives, 1984).
However studies relating fertility to family planning activity and development (Lapham
and Maudlin, 1984, Bongaarts,  Maud!in  and Phillips, 1990,  Maudlin  and Ross, 1991, Bongaarts,
1992) suffer from three (fatal) flaws in empirical implementation. They limit the indicator of
development  to a single index, which causes two problems.  First, this aggregation of various
economic  or social indicators -- such as per capita income and infant mortality -- into a single
index imposes  on the empirical results that each element of the development  index affect fertility
exactly the same 33. Imposing this false constraint on the data increases the portion of fertility
I  For instance, if one has an index of development  that consists of three elements, say per
capita income (Y), infant mortality (M), and literacy (L) with weights  ay, a,,  a,  , then DI32
not explained  by "development"  and hence the fraction  which is potentially  explained  by FPE.
Second, the use of a development  index excludes all other social indicators not in the index
importantly, female schooling. This will also inflate the amount of fertility explained by FPE.
Third, these studies generally ignore the potential endogeneity, that is that FPE responds to
changed  fertility desires and not vice versa. With the combination  of these three effects it would
be possible to find with empirical data an arbitrarily large effect to FPE, even controlling for
a development  index, even if the true effect of an exogenous  increase in FPE were zero34.
These flaws are not hypothetical,  as the results are completely  different  if desired fertility
or its socioeconomic  determinants are controlled for properly.  If FPE is added to fertility
regressions which control for desired fertility (as above with adding contraceptive  prevalence)
=  ayY + amM + a,L  . Entering this into an equation  for fertility with a variable -epresenting
family planning  efforts FPE would be:  TFR =  #DI  + 5FPE  + e.  . This form impose that
income and infant mortality have numerically  exactly the same impact on fertility.
3  As a simple, hypothetical  example: the true model was that fertility was determined by
income  (Y)  positively  and  female  education  (FE)  negatively and  a  random  term:
TFR = ,B Y +  B2 FE + e . Say the "development  index" gave equal weight to income and
female  edcuation,  DI  =  ao*Y  +  aI *FE  . If FPE were related  positively  to female  education,
FPE = 8 *FE + rj  then a regression  of TFR on the development  index and FPE can produce
large and significant  negative  effects for FPE (with the size determined  by the error terms and
cross correlations of  Y and  FE),  in  spite of  the  fact that, by  construction, FPE has no
independent  impact on TFR at all in this hypothetical  example.33
the estimated impact of FPE is statistically  significant, but quite small".  The coefficient on
FPE is -.007 (t-statistics  2.21) using DTFR and -.012 (3.31) using WTFR.  This implies that
a move from zero FPE to the mean level of country effort, holding  desired fertility fixed, would
reduce fertility by only between .22 and .37 births per woman (e.g. -.007*31.4=.22)36. Even
in the absolute extreme case of moving a country from no family planning  program at all (zero
FPE) to the largest FPE in the sample (80 percent of the maximum)  would reduce fertility by
only .56 and  1 births, a very small fraction of the differences in actual fertility.  As with
contraceptive  prevalence, the incremental  explanatory  power of FPE in both regressions was
very low, .006 (DTFR) and .03 (WTFR), hence FPE explains at most 3 percent of fertility
variations.
Although desired fertility is independent  of contraceptive  access (and from the Matlab
evidence family planning  effort) the assertion is stilr more problematic with respect to overall
family planning effort, which includes information  dissemination  and encouragement  of small
families.  However, two recent studies (Schultz, 1993, and Subbarao and Raney, 1993) show
once the effects of the various socio-economic  variables are  not artificially constrained and
35  Since the FPE numbers are available  only for 1972, 1982  and 1989 and the dates of the
surveys are fixed various ways of matching FPE to surveys were tried (e.g. using the closet
year, using the average FPE).  The use of the closest PPE score preceding the survey data is
used because it gave results most favorable to FPE.  For instance, using the closest FPE score
gave smaUer  coefficients, -.003 and -.009 using DTFR or WVTFR.
I'  The FPE indicators are expressed as a fraction of the maximum  effort, so the scale is 0
to 1n0.  The mean level of effort in our sample is 31.4.34
endogeneity  is accounted for the empirical estimates of FPE effect are small (everi possibly
zero) 37. This  is consistent with the view that fertility desires are  largely determined by
socioeconomic  forces other than family planning  and that fertility desires determine fertility.
Using data across countries and over time and controlling  for female and male education
separately and other factors 38 Schultz (1993) has four findings.  First,  in a  reduced form
equation (with child mortality  excluded as potentially  endogenous)  the largest estimates of the
FPE impact  are found. Even here the statistically  significant  estimate is empirically  quite small,
-.019 (only slightly  large than our highest). Moving from no family program at all (FPE equal
zero) at all to the average level of FPE would decrease fertility by only about .65 births 39.
Second, the fraction of  fertility variation explained by differences in FPE was less than 5
percente.  Third, after controlling for the potential  endogeniety  of FPE (that is, that is caused
37  Earlier studies found this suggestions  of this same effect, as for instance Lapham and
Maudlin, 1985  find that FPE "explains"  ninety  percent of contraceptive  prevalence  as a bivariate
regressor but  when socioeconomic effects are  controlled for separately (although without
separating male and female education)  the incremental  explanatory  power of program effort is
about seven percent.
38  Also in the regression are GDP per adult, urbanization, fraction of male labor force in
agriculture, religion dummies  (Catholic, Muslim, Protestant), and child mortality.
39  Subbarao  and Raney 1993 also find in a cross-country  regression  explaining 1985 TFR,
after  controlling for  the  1970 male and  female secondary enrollment, GDP  per  capita,
urbanization, and population  per physician, the effect of increasing  FPE by one unit was -.021,
striking similar to the Schultz reduced form OLS results.
I  This low additional  explanatory  power is not surprising,  given the high level of predictive
ability of  socioeconomic variables alone,  especially once male and  female education are
distinguished. For instance, Barro and Lee (1993b)  using GDP per capita, mortality variables,
and their new data on male and female education stocks, explain (log) fertliy  with R-squared
values of .90 across countries, and even .63 in for changes from 1965 to 1985.35
by rather than causes, changing  fertility desires) the estimate  of FPE is positiv,  but statistically
insignificant. Fourth, the time series variation  using fixed effects  estimates finds no empirically
significant  effect for FPE at all.
Supply  and Demand for Contretion.  Child Costs, and Fertility
The apparent paradox about the importance  of the "supply' of contraception  on fertility
stems from linguistic  confusion about the term "supply."  Since in the demographer's terms
(Bongaarts, 1978), contraception is  an  important proximate determinant of  fertility (in a
mechanical  sense the probability of a birth in any given  period is the product of coital frequency,
natural fecundity,  and contraceptive  efficacy), this is at times taken as evidence that expanding
the 'supply'  of contraception is an important condition for reducing fertility.  However, this
confuses  an expansion  of the "supply" of contraception  - the entire schedule of the amount of
contraception that would be available at various prices - with an expansion in the "quantity
supplied" of  contraception - the  amount  supplied at  a  given  price.  The  finding that
contraceptive use  (quantity supplied) increases as  fertilty  declines does  not  imply that
contraceptive supply (usuaUy  referred to as "access" or "availability") is an important causal
deterninant of ferdlity declines.
A large increase in contraceptive  prevalence may be the result of a movement along a
given supply curve of contraception  as demand for contraception  shifts due to changed demand
for children caused by factors independent  of contraception (for example, increased women's36
education,  household  income  or child  mortality).  In this  case,  a high  correlation  of contraceptive
prevalence  (the quantity  supplied  of contraception)  with fertility  is the result of shifts in the
derived  demand  for contraceptives,  not shifts  of the supply  curve itself.  The impact of an
exogenous  fall in the price of contraceptive  services  (where  the price includes  the total direct
costs to the user, including  travel, inconvenience,  service  quality, method  suitability,  etc.)
caused  by a shift  of the entire  supply  relation  is determined  by the elasticity  of the demand  for
contraception. If the demand for contraception  is  inelastic  with respect to the cost of
contraception  (as we argue below is the case intuitively  and empirically)  then a shift of the
supply  relation  would have very little effect on the use of contWaception  (and a fortion on
fertility).
This implies  that all cross-country  or household  calculations  that show  strong  statistical
relationships  between  contraceftive  use and lower fertility  that do not adequately  control  for
shifting  demand  are simply  not to the point  in assessing  the implications  of a shift  in the supply
of contraceptives. Any correlation,  no matter  how perfect, between  contraceptive  use and
fertility  may simply  represent  movements  of quantity  supplied.
Figure  3 illustrates  this point  with  a hypothetical  demand-supply  diagram. Suppose  that
the demand  for contraception  is entirely  derived  from the demand  for limiting  childbearing  and
that depends  only (for simplicity)  on women's wages  (w).  Also suppose  that the supply  of
contraception  is private  but receives  a per unit subsidy  from the government  of s.  If women's
wages rise from w to w'  then the demand  for contraception  shifts and total contraceptive37
prevalence  (quantity  supplied  which equals  quantity  demanded)  increases  from Q to Q' in a
movement  along the given  supply  curve.
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If, on the other hand,  the government  increases  the per unit subsidy  on contracption,
that would  shift the  supply  relation  from s to s'.  In this diagram,  lower contaceptive  costs
induced  by the subsidy  only induces  a small  increase  in quantity  demanded  (from Q' to Q")
because  it is assumed  to be inelastic.38
Is the available evidence consistent with this view -- an elastic supply of contraception
and an inelastic  demand for contraception,  and more especially  an inelastic demand for children
with respect to contraceptive  costs? Demand for children must be inelastic with respect to total
contraception  costs (which again subsumes  price, information, access, and availability) both
because demand for children is relatively  price inelastic and because contraception  costs are a
very small fraction of total child costs.  The marginal cost of avoiding the birth of a child is
generally trivial compared to the marginal cost of having a child.  Table 4 presents various
estimates of the monetary cost of avoiding  a single birth through the use of various forms of
contraception  in developing  countries. These costs depend on the cost per couple per year and
number of years of use to avert a birth.  The full costs are somewhat difficult to pin down as
we neither want public cost per user (which may overstate the marginal cost) nor prices paid by
users (which often include a substantial  subsidy  element).  The range of estimates is large, but
a fair guess of the cost range for the pill (a relatively expensive temporary method typically
chosen to space, not limit births, and hence a high side estimate)  would be $30-$100 per birth
avoided. For ending reproduction, sterilization  is a much cheaper option as it avoids all future
births.  Its cost per year of protection  is low, ranging from $8.9 from $2.9.  A very high-side
estimate of the typical total direct contraceptive  cost per avoided birth for a woman would be
$50 per birth avoided. 4'
41  Even these numbers must be a substantial  overestimate  of the minimum monetary cost
of achieving  a given level of fertility. Any given target level of family  size can be achieved  with
post-partum amenorrhea and abstinence combined with rhythm to space and sterilization to
terminate. Moreover, all of these cost estimates  of course ignore the difficult  and delicate  issue
that there exists a backstop effective method to avoid conception with zero monetary cost:
abstinence.  The true cost of this method would require a calculation of the benefits foregone
from coital abstinence.  This is not zero and not infinite, but narrowing the range further is39
Table 4  Estimates  of the cost of avoiding  a birth in developing countries
Study  Country/Region  Method  Per couple  Per averted
l  year  birth
l  _______________  protection
A)  Molyneaux  and  Indonesia  Pill  $14  $49
Diman (1991)  $11.2
l  __________________  _______________  (insertion)
B)  World Bank  SSA  Pill  $27  $94.5
(1992)  ME&NA  Pill  $43  $150
LAC  Pill  $48  $168
Asia  Pill  $14  $49
C)  Cochrane and Sai  Sri Lanka  per user  $9.2  $31
(1991)  Pakistan  per user  $22  $71
Jordan  per user  $31  $88
._______________  j  Nepal  per user  $80  $330
D)  Schwartz,  Philippines  pill  $8.3  $29
and others (1989)  Thailand  pill  $8.5  $30
Jamaica  pill  $8.3  $29
E)  Cochrane,  Morocco  Sterilization  $8.9
Hammer, and  Intdonesia  Sterilization  $2.9
others (1990)  l
F)  Schearer (1983)  20 Median  pill  $33.5
Countries
14 Median  sterilization  $12.25
Countries
Notes:  A) Reports commercial  prices (which are several multiples  the public sector price), B)
reports summaries from surveys of commercial  prices, C) reports public family planning
expenditures  per user, D) reports mean prices paid by users, E) reports cost to the user, F)
reports unsubsidized  commercial  prices, sterilization  assumes 15 years of use.  All costs have
been translated to 1992 prices.
A child is well known  to be tremendously  more costly because a birth generally  obligates
the parents to incur a stream of large annual  expenses. While measuring  the total cost of a child
problematical.40
with precisioi, is impossible, we can fix some orders of magnitude. Table 5 presents various
estimates  of just the direct money  expenditures  for maintaining  a child expressed as a fraction
of adult consumption  or household  income. These are derived from "equivalence  scales" and
represent roughly the additional income a  household would need in  order to  maintain its
consumption  of non-child  goods after adding  an additional  child.  A child costs between 30-50
percent of per adult consumption.
In addition to these direct monetary expenditures  of a child, there are the substantial
opportunity  costs from the time allocated  to child care, which  may be as high as the direct costs
(Lindert, 1980, Joshi, 1990). For example, evidence from the rural United  States in the early
twentieth  century suggests  women spent 10 hours per week caring for young  children. Women
aged 15-39 in a Javanese village spend 8.9 hours weekly on child care plus another 17.2 on
household  food preparation and 10 on other household maintenance  (amounts  which are also
likely to be higher with a larger family).  Women aged 15-39 in a Nepalese village spend an
estimated 8.9, 15.4 and 6.7 hours on the same three activities.  There are some economies  of
scale to children in both monetary  and time costs, and older children do help with household
tasks, factors which make higher order births less costly.  But these economies of scale are
probably played out quite rapidly and the time costs of caring for higher order children are still
substantial. These are only the direct time costs and likely understate  the impact of children  on
women time use allocation and also do not account for changes  in women's productivity  in other
activities, due to pregnancy or lactation.41
Table 5 Direct cost of a child as a fraction of adult expenditure  or household  income
Fractioa  of
Sandy~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~  I  onz  fSuyCDSUPOlI___ 
Year  Adult  Household  Iacome
Study  Countty  of Studly  Coasumption  enra  Is  _  jd  Cal  a  1t  2nd  3rd_
Deaton  and  Sri Lank  1969-70  30-40%
Muellbauer  (1986)  Indonesia  1978  30-40%
Hendemson  (1950)  Gaat Britain/  1938  41%  29%
low income
Ehpenahade  ad  USA/low  income  1972  40%  18%  17%
Calhoun  (1986)
Ulewwe  (1987a  CMe  dilvoite  1985  33%
and  1987b)  Peru  1985-6  33%
Chougvatana  ad  hailand  (Bangkok)  1978  19.2%
ohens  (1982)  1  1
Suppose that,  on the basis of these estimates, the direct  monetary costs are 20 percent
of household income and all other indirect costs (including costs not typically measured such as
matemal mortality risks) are half of that amount.  Total annual costs of an additional child would
be 30 percent of annual household money income'2. To calculate the lifetime cost of additional
child these annual costs need to be summed.  Tables 6 and 7 show the discounted value of direct
and total costs for various levels of annual household income (and various discount rates).  Even
for the poorest economies with average household income of $1,500'3,  the total discounted cost
(at 5 percent) of a child is over $5,000.  This is two orders of magnitude (100 times) larger than
the  cost  of  avoiding  one  additional  child.  This  ratio  is  even  higher  for  higher  levels  of
42  It will be noted that the indirect costs are non-monetary and hence 30 percent  of money
income  does  not  imply  30 percent  of  tQt  income,  inclusive  of  male  and  female  non labor
market  time.
43  For instance,  a country with per capita personal income of $300 and average household
size  of  5  has  an  average  household  income  of  $1,500.  For  instance,  average  household
consumption  expenditure in Ghana in  1987-88 was $1,680  when per  capita  GDP was around
$400.42
household  income.'
Tale  6  Estimated lifetime  child costs for various levels of household income
Average household  income J  Direct  Total child costs
$1,500  $3,450  $5,250
$3,000  $6,900  $10,500
$6,000  $13,800  $21,060
Measuring either the cost of avoiding  a birth or the costs of a child are very difficult,
both conceptually  and empirically,  and both of these estimates are subject to a wide margin of
error.  Nevertheless, it is very difficult  to gainsay differences of two orders of magnitude  or
larger.  The cost of avoiding  a child is very small relative to the cost of having and raising a
child.
Table 7  Child cost as a multiple of household  income for various assumptions about cost.
discount  rate
Fraction of Income
|  Discount Rate  15%  20%  30%
3%  2.1  2.8  4.1
5%  1.75  2.3  3.5
10%  i  1.2  1.6  2.5
4  Although of course this raises the difficulty  with defining 'child costs'  (see Birdsall,
Cochrane, and van der Gaag, 1987). Presumably  parents at higher levels of income  could raise
a child for the same money  cost as could lower income parents (although that might require
feeding the child much less well than  the adults). However, in contemplating  an additional  child
parents can be expected to anticipate  actual conventional expenditures for parents similarly
placed,  not the minimum  feasible ccs: of raising a child to maturity.43
Obviously  there is a counterbalancing  large flow of benefits to parents generated by an
additional  child, as evidenced  by the simple fact that people express strong  desires for children.
The decision  to have another child is based on comparing  total (gross) costs of childbearing to
the total (gross)  benefits to find the net cost (or benefit)  of an additional  child.  Even if the net
cost of a child is very low, and does not rise with family size so that larger family sizes are
desirable, this does not imply that the gross costs are small, only that the gross benefits are
large.  For instance,  if children work for income or help with household  chores (child feeding,
water, or firewood  gathering), this raises the benefits relative to costs and hence raises the net,
but not the gross, cost.
One of the benefits of childbearing  is avoiding  corntraception  costs. If gross benefits are
large relative  to contraceptive  costs, then even  very lauge  perc,ntage differences  in contceptive
costs would  lead to small changes  in the gross benefits  of a child. This would lead one to expect
that the  demand for  children would be  very inelastic, or  unresponsive, with  respect  to
contraceptive  costs, simply because they are a small fraction  of total costs. An analogy would
be  to think of  households' decisions to  purchase a  major consumer durable,  such  as  an
automobile. There is a large flow of gross costs (purchase  price, gas, repairs, motor oil, etc.)
balanced  against a large flow of the benefits from the services the automobile  provides.  People
purchase cars as long as the net benefit per dollar is greater than that from other goods, which
implies  that the net benefit at the optimal  consumption  level is very much smaller than either the
gross cost or gross benefit. One could ask, how many  additional  cars would  people buy if motor44
oil were free? 45 Not many.  Of course, this is not to say that people make decisions  about
children the way they do about cars, but the principle -- that small components  of cost have
small affects -- is the same.
Some would argue the cost of contraception  is irrelevant for many couples since they
can't afford it.  However, being so poor as to not afford contraception would also imply, a
fortiori, that another unwanted  child isn't affordable  either.  Moreover, if costs per couple year
of protection are $15.50, then even for a household  of four at an international  poverty line of
$1 per person per day (see World Development  Report 1990), contraception would cost 1
percent of household income.  While this is a burden, 1 to 3 percent is roughly the same
percentage of income that low income households  in poor countries devote to expenditures  on
tobacco.
This intuition  about respensiveness  of childbearing  to contraceptive  costs derived from
comparing  relative  cost shares, hence that child demand will be inelastic, accords well with the
few Lmpirical  estimates  of the price elasticity  of the demand for contraceptives. A review of
such estimates cited in a recent report finds that estimated elasticities for individual modes of
contraception  are quite low.  Schwartz  and others (1989) show a price elasticity  of the demand
for the pill of -.0C3  in the Philippines,  -.08 in Jamaica, and -.09 in Thailand. These elasticities
45  The cost in the United States of an automobile  per 10,000 miles in 1989 was estimated
at $3,820 (Statistical  Abstract  of the United  States, 1991). Assuming  three oil changes  for every
10,000 miles and $15 per oil change (only $5 of which is for oil), this suggests  that motor oil
is about the same fraction  of cost (1 in 100)  as is the cost of contraception  in the gross cost of
a child.45
of particular methods  overestimate  the elasticity of total contraceptive  use to price changes as
they include the effect of substitution  between contraceptive  methods (for example, switching
from the pill to IUD).  A study in Indonesia  (Molyneaux  and Diman, 1991) finds the net price
elasticity  of all contraceptive  use with respect to pill prices is only -.02, a fifth their estimated
pill use elasticity of -.11.  This implies that a  100 percent increase in pill prices would only
reduce modern contraceptive  use by 2 percent.  The Indonesia  study estimated that a doubling
of all contraceptive  method prices would  reduce use by just 3 percentage points, from 43 to 40
percent.
Even these small responses of contraceptive use responses overstate the elasticity of
fertili  to contraceptive  prices if some of this effect is a shift from modem to non-modern
method use.  Among the alternatives to modern contraceptives  are  less effective forms of
contraception  (for example, rhythm, withdrawal)  and more effective  (but psychologically  more
costly) forns of avoiding  births (for example, delayed marriage, long post-partum  abstinence)
so that even the small price elasticity of modern contraceptive  use must substantially  overstate
the responsiveness  of fertility to contraceptive  costs.
Schultz (1993) also includes the price of oral contraceptives  in a regression that links
fertility with various determinantse in a  sample of  LDCs and finds it  small and  (barely)
statistically significant.  The implied elasticity of fertility with respect to (pill) contraception
I  The regressors were: women's wages, men's wages, GDP per adult, urbanization, child
mortality  rates, year dummy  variables  and three variables for the fraction  of population  whether
Catholic, Protestant, Muslim.46
costs is .05 (higher prices raise fertility).  With these estimates reducing the price of oral
contraceptives  from the mean of $38 per year to zero would decrease fertility by less than 5
percent, about .26 births.
This small relative component  of contraceptive  costs in the total costs and benefits of a
child is of course relevant to the early discussion  of whether desired fertility is determined  by
contraceptive  costs.  The fact that contraceptive  costs are not the major element in the child
bearing decision  reenforces all of the above arguments that individuals  can and have correctly
answered survey questions about how many children they would have if contraception  were
perfect and free.
The question of  the supply of contraception is altogether more difficult to address
empirically,  as in many countries  the market has been dominated  by government  or government
regulation. However, since the costs and benefits of contraceDtion  are primarily  private4'  and
there are no significant  economies  of scale in provision, it is not clear why the private market
would  not adequately  meet the effective  demand  for contraception,  as it does  with so many other
goods'.  While there  are  information gaps  and  people  must learn  of  the  benefits of
contraception  in order to have demand, this is certainly not unique to contraception  and is a
I  While there are some arguments  that children  produce negative  externalities,  so that their
social costs are greater than private costs, this effect is small relative to the enormous private
costs discussed  above.
'  As one observer pointed out, if Coke can be in every village in Africa then so could
condoms.47
probelm  solved  with the introduction  of any new product or service. Especially  since most
contraceptives  are internationally  tradable  (except,  of course, for components  or procedures
which  require  clinical  services)  it is difficult  to see why,  in the absence  of govemmental  barriers
and active  opposition,  the supply  of contraception  would  not be elastic.
Hstorical  and Household  Evidence  on Contraceitive  Access
Almost  by definition  the historical  evidence  suggests  that modern  contraceptive  access
was  not a necessary  condition  for lowering  fertilty.  Many  societies  were able  to achieve  rates
of fertlity substantially  below  those  currently  observed  in developing  countries  well  before  the
advent of any modern means  of birth control.  While crude birth rates are not directly
comparable  because  of differences  in demographic  structure,  it is strildng  that crude  birth  rates
around  1800  in European  countries  (about  31 births per 1,000)  were roughly  equal  to those  in
lower-middle  income  countnes  today  (30  births  per 1,000)  and a quarter  lgwer  than  that of the
low income  counties (38 births per 1,000) (rable 8).  The lack of any modern  means  of
contwaception  did not prevent  eighteenth  century  European  peasants  from achieving  levels  of
ferdlity  lower  than those  observed  today  in many  developing  countries  with  non-contraceptive
practices  (e.g. high  age at marriage)  playing  a role.  The very uneven  progress  of the fertility
revolution  both  within  countries  in Europe  and across  European  countries  suggests  that shifts  in
contraceptive  technology  or availability  were not a major  factor  in the fertility  revolution. 4
49  The historical,  especially  European,  fertility  record was early on used  as an argument
against  the importance  of contraception  in the demographic  traisition  and  is cited  as an argument
by Becker,  1991. However,  the fact  modern  contraception  was not necessary  historically  does48
Table 8  Crude birth rates (births Mer  1.000 population)  in Europe. circa 1800 and in selected
developing  countries  or rezions, 1990
r  I  | Developing  country or  |
Europe, circa 1800  region, 1990
Denmark  29.9  Nigeria  43
France  32.9  Bolivia  36
Germany'  39.5  Algeria  36
Norway  27.2  India  30
Sweden  28.7  China  22
ULT'  30.3  Average low income  38
(excluding China, India)
Average  30.6  Average for lower-  30
middle  income
1.  United  Kingdom, 1838; Germany, 1817.
Source  Mitchell, 1978 and World Development  Report 1992.
A great deal of household  evidence  is also consistent  with the view that fertlity variations
are not due to natural fecundity differences and that cost of contraception  or proximity to
contraceptive outlets are  not large  determinants of  fertility, after  controlling for fertlity
desires.0 Rosenzweig and  Schultz (1987),  use  birth histories of  Malaysian women to
disentangle  the relative influence on completed family size of estimated  couple fecundity.  If
fertility  control  were impossible  (or very expensive)  then each couple's natural fecundity  should
not imply it will not be an independent factor if introduced,  which is a stronger statement  that
our evidence  suggests.
50 This is not intended as a review of the literature.  This section simply shows that the
reported cross-national  results are  not sharply at odds with the household literqture.  The
literature  on the impact  of family  planning  programs,  more broadly  taken  than  just contrawption,
is discussed  in a subsequent  article.49
explain a large fraction of couple's actual fertility differences.  In contrast, their estimates  of
couple's fecundity,  although  a statistically  significant  determinant,  explains  only 2 percent of the
total variability of fertility. This is even a smaller fraction than they found (Rosenzweig  and
Schultz, 1985) in the United States, where they find 10 percent of fertility is explained  by
fecundity.
Gertler  and Molyneaux  (1992)  use Indonesian  household  survey  data on fertility  combined
with district and subdistrict  level data on economic  conditions, schooling,  and family  planning
program efforts to explain the large (25 percent) decline in fertility from 1982 to 1987. They
fnd  that as a proximate determinant  increased contraceptive use explains 75 percent of the
fertility decline.  However, after accounting for changes in demand for contraception,  their
estimate is that exogenous  variation  in family planning inputs accounts  for only 4-8 percent of
fertility decline,  and point estimates of  the  magnitude of  the  impact are  small and not
significantly different from zero.'  Similarly, Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons (1993) using
Indonesian data over time at the subdistrict (kecamatan) level find that after controlling for
program placement, no statistically  significant effect of family planning clinic placement on
fertility. These papers are confirmation with  household data that very  strong associations
between changes in contraceptive  prevalence and fertility change are perfectly consistent  with
a very small, or even zero, effect of supply shifts of contraception  on fertility.
51  In their weighted  fixed effects estimates of fertility change their four measures  of sub-
district level family  planning  effort (monthly  family  planning  worker visits, village  contraceptive
distribution centers, number of health clinics, numbers of family planning field workers) were
individually  and jointly not statistically  significant.so
In a series of papers Cochrane and Guilkey  (1991, 1992a  and 1992b)  estimate the effect
of contraceptive access or  family planning effort after accounting for  fertility demand in
Zimbabwe,  Tunisia, and Colombia.  In Zimbabwe,  they find that although receipt of a family
planning  message  has some effect on women wanting  to space  their children, neither receipt of
a family planning  message nor the presence of a community  based distributor (CBD) has any
significant  effect on the fraction of women wanting no more children.  They also find that of
seven indicators of family planning access only one (presence  of a CBD) had even a modest
effect on the use of modem contraception, given fertlity intentions.'  In Colombia, none of
the  family planning access  variables" 3 were  significant in  reduced  form  regressions  for
contraceptive  use.  In structural equations explaining  contraceptive  use, either in total or for
individual  methods (pill, TUD, traditional), none of the access variables were significant  at the
5 percent level.  However, the effect of fertlity intentions  was large and strongly significant.
For Tunisia, they find moderately more positive results for the impact of access on use, as
methods available and  having  received a  message are  both  significant detenninants  of
contraceptive  use, although these are still much less important  than ferdlity intentions'.
52 The seven indicators of family planning  access used were five locational variables (the
presence  within 5 kilometers of a family plaming clinic, a hospital, a mission, a health clinic,
or a pharmacy)  and two additional variables (the receipt  of a family planning message and the
presence  of a CBD).
53  The seven access variables were: number of methods available, receipt of a family
planning  message  and the presence within 5 kilometers  of various  sources of supply (doctor, two
different  types of clinics, a hospital or a pharmacy).
I  The estimates for the influence of access must be considered  an upper bound access as
having  received a message is treated as exogenous  even  though  certainly  a woman with stronger
desire to control fertlity,  even for a given level of expressed ferdlity intention, is more likely
to seek out and recall having received a message.51
There is also some household  evidence of an experimental nature bearing  on this issue.
The Contraceptive Distribution Project in  1975 divided the Matlab region of Bangladesh 55
randomly  into villages  in the treatment  area, in which households received  contraceptives  (pills
or  condoms) free -- delivered to  the door, and a  comparison area with only the regular
government program.  The findings from this attempt to bring about a large reduction in
contraceptive  costs in the treatment  area were that, in the second project year, the total fertility
rate was 1.8 percent higher in the treatment area, in spite of the expanded access (Stinson  and
others, 1982).
Some household  evidence,  survey  and experimental, is consistent  with the findings  from
the cross national data that although  contraception  and its expansion is an important  proximate
determinant of fertility, this is almost  exclusively  due to shifts in the demand for children  which
shift the demand for contraception. Very little of household  variation in fertility, either in cross-
section or over time, is attributable  to variations in the supply of contraception.
Evidence to the contrary
The evidence so far shows that high fertility is largely desired and is not primarily a
consequence  of the difficulty  or expense  of controlling fertlity.  How does this evidence square
with the evidence  often cited to support  a large role for contraceptive  access and family  planning
55  This was prior to the more extensive  experiment  FPHSP described  above and discussed
in more detail below that began in October of 1977.52
programs? We will examine  three strands  of this evidence;  the existence  of a large "unmet
need"  for contraception,  the ongoing  fertlity change  in developing  countries,  and finally  the
evidence  from the widely  cited experiment  in Matlab,  Bangladesh.
'Unmet ne  There is a large (and  widely  cited)  body  of evidence  that a substantial
"unme.t  need" 5' for contraception  exists. This might  suggest  that fertility  rates are affected  by
a lack  of available  contraception.  However,  the finding  that  contraceptive  access  is unimportant
as a  determinant  of total fertility is consistent  with these findings  of  "unmet need'  for
contraception.  The figures  for "unmet  need"  assume  that every  woman  who reports  herself  as
not wanting  a child  immediately  and not currently  using  contraception  is in 'need' of modern
contraception.  Besides  its conceptual  drawbacks  (see  below)  this  construct  vastly  overstates  the
potential  effect  of improved  contraceptive  provision.
The level  of "unmet  need"  or other  measures  of contraceptive  access  are not empirically
important  determinants  of fertility. Calculations  of the  fertility  reductions  from  reducing  'unmet
need"  are generally  based  on idealized  assumptions  about  the effect  on fertility,  for instance  that
all women  would  then meet their spacing  and limiting  fertility  targets  exactly".  In order to
56  "Unmet need*  is left m quotations  as in the current  discussion  it is a reference  to a
specific  concept  used in discussions  of family  planning  programs,  not a use, of the term.
-' This  is an important  distinction  between  the  approach  in this  paper and many  calculations
done  claiming  to demonstrate  the importance  of access. We  focus  on the cross  country  variation
in fertility  or excess  ferdlity,  comparing  these  in countries  at various  levels  of access,  FPE, or
"unmet need.'  We  do  not  assume that excess fertility can  be  eiminated entirely.
Econometrically  speaking,  we examine  the impact  of shifts  along a regression  line (the slope)
across  countries,  rather than shifting  the line for all countries  (changing  the constant). We do53
calculate the actual effects of changes in "unmet need,"  table 9 reports coefficient  and the
incremental  R2 from including  various measures  of contraceptive availability  - "unmet need",
percentage of demand satisfied, and proportion of exposed women who do not want more
children but are not using contraception  - in  the regression explaining total fertility after
including desired fertility (DTFR) 58. Only between 4 percent and 6.5 percent of the fertility
variation is  accounted for by  variations in  'unmet  need"  or  variants on  that measure 5 '.
Calculations below suggest that "unmet need'  could be reduced by improved contraceptive
access by only about one-third. By these esdmates, even reducing "unmet need" by one-third
(about one standard deviation)  by eliminating  all access related "unmet need' would reduce
fertility by less than half a birth.
S
not make hypothetical  calculations  as to what fertility would be if all mistimed or unwanted
births are eliminated  because since that never happens in any country, it is simply irrelevant.
"  The "unmet need" is only available for DHS countries so the sample sizes are much
smaller.
59  The fraction of  variation explained (the R2)  is  a  function of  the  variation in  the
independent variable and the magnitude  of the impact of variations.  In this case, the small
fraction of variation explained  is not due to low variability of unmet need, but simply  because
the estimated impact  is small.54
Table 9  Estimates of  the  relationship between various measures of  "unmet need"  for
contraception  on actual fertility. controlling for fertility desires (DTFR)
Incremental
Coefficient  t-stat  N  R2
"Unmet need"  .056  6.8  25  .056
Percentage  of total contraceptive  -.036  4.4  25  .039
demand satisfied
Percentage  of currently married  .141  8.91  25  .064
fecund  women not wanting
more children not using
contraception  _
The cross-country  estimates in table 9 together with reference the figures on  "unmet
need" in table 10 can illustrate  the impact  of a very large reduction  in "unmet need". In Ghana,
if "unmet  need" were reduced by a third, from 35 percent to 23 percent, or 12 percentage points
(which is actually more the total estimated access related non-use of 7 percent), this would
reduce fertility  only from 6.4 to 5.7.  This result is intuitively  quite plausible  as Ghana's DTFR
is 5.4 and 90 percent of births are wanted.60 The evidence of substantial "unmet need" for
contraception is thus compatible with a practically quite small (although statistically quite
significant)  effect of contraceptive  access on fertility.
The combination of very high t-statistics with a  low fraction of  the total variation
explained highlights  an important  point in interpreting  the statistical  results shown in Table 9.
60 Since .9 * 6.4  =  5.7, this implies that all unwanted  births would be eliminated, which
suggests that even this modest reduction in TFR is likely to be an overestimate  or that such a
reduction in "unmet need" is not feasible.55
The fact that the point estimate is a small absolute number with a high t-statistic implies very
precise estimates,  which  means that not only can we rule out zero effect (that is, reject the t-test)
but we can also rule out anything much larger than the empirically small estimated effect as
well.  For instance, while the point estimate of the effect of decreasing unmet need by a third
of the average (eight percentage points) is a reduction in TFR of .46, even if we add two
standard deviations  to the point estimate, the simulated  fertility effect of the same reduction in
"unmet need" is an only slightly higher. .58 births."'
The evidence of large "unmet need" for family planning (Westoff and Ochoa, 1991) is
often cited in discussions of the effect on population  growth of increased provision of family
planning  services (UN, 1991, World Bank, 1993b), but given the evidence above how large is
the potential?
First, it must be recognized  that the assumptions  "unmet  need" reflects women who want
family planning  services  or that unmet  need  could be zero under  some access conditions  are both
false.  Although  general usage ranks "needs" higher in the hierarchy of want than "demands"
or "desires"  in calculating  "unmet need" all women  not wanting a child immediately  who report
not using contraception  (even  for reasons  other than cost or availability,  for example, infrequent
sexual activity,  don't like the side effects  or have  religious  objections)  are classified  as 'needing'
contraception. In Sub-Saharan  Africa, only 37 percent of those with "unmet need" intend to use
contraception,  even though 85 percent know of a modem method. Therefore, women who have
61  For example, .056+2*(.00828)=.0725 and .0725*8=.58.56
no demonstrated  demand nor expressed  desire for family planning  are reported  as "needing" it.
"Unmet  need" does  not reflect  just women who want contraceptives  (supply  need)  but also those
r
women who require motivation to want what they need.  This usage is consistent  only with
either a very broad, or very paternalistic, definition  of 'need."
This is important  because the fraction of women not using family  planning because of
access, the supply  portion of "unmet need", is quite small.  In many of the surveys, typically
only one-quarter  to one-third  of women who report that they "would  not be happy if they were
to become  pregnant  in the next few weeks" who are not using contraception  report contraceptive
supply  or access (taken  broadly to include knowledge,  availability,  or cost) as the major reason
for not using family planning6'. Since access is not the issue for much of "unmet need" even
costless availability  of contraception would not drive "unmet need" down very far, a point
confirmed  by the existence  of substantial  "unmet needw  even in counties with excellent  access
(table 10).
62  See the footnote  in Table 10 for the exact survey questions. It can be legitimately  argued
that this understates  the importance  of access.  Access may not be named as the primary reason
althouth  is a factor.  Also, better access could reduce or change other reasons for non-use, like
like fear of side effects.57
Table  0  Estimates  of  'unmet need'. demand satisfied. and access related  nonuse. selected developing countries., 1985-91
fecmd  mnied  Pemtentage  of women  not using
women  who  don't  contraception  due  to access *Unmet  Permentage  of  Percentage  spacih  wadnt  more  ebildren Country  S9ey  Year  Need*  'demand'  satisfied  danand satisfied  who  are  not  using  Definition  I  Definition  2
contnreptio
Sub-Saran  Afrs  -
lBotswana  DHS  1988  26.9  53.6  46.4  6.5  3.6
|Bumndi  DHS  1987  25.1  25.8  24.7  5.1
Ghana  DHS  1988  35.2  26.8  23.4  7  7.0
Kenya  DHS  1989  38  41.5  27.7  11.S  14.1
LAberia  DHS  1986  32.8  16.4  15.4  4.6  2.5
Mali  DHS  19S7  22.9  17  18.9  4.3  _
Nigerib  DHS  1990  - - 6.3
Sudan  DHS  1990  _  2.6
Togo  DHS  19t8  40.1  23.2  22  8.5
Uganda  DHS  1989  27.2  15.2  9.5  5.2  11.4
Zimbabwe  DHS  1989  21.7  66.5  73.1  8.1  3.8
Ash  ____  _  -_  _  _  _  _  ___
Indonesia  DHS  1987  16  73.8  62.5  5  11.1
Pekisdn  DHS  1991  - 75 
Sn Lanka  DHS  1987  12.3  81.3  60.9  4.1  1.8
TMailand  DHS  1987  11.1  85  72.9  4.3  0.3
Middle  Est and  North Ahca58
Egypt  [  DHS  1983  25.2  58.4  35.8  9.8
Moroceo  DHS  19S7  22.1  59.1  48.1  6.5
Tunisia  DHS  1938  19.7  70  54.2  5. 
Ltin  Amekea ad  the Caibbeam
Bolivia  DHS  1989  35.7  43.4  37.1  15.2  11.4
Brazil  DHS  19S6  12.  3S1.6  74  5*7
Colombia  DHS  19t6  13.5  30.1  69.7  6.2  _
Dominicn Republic  DHS  19S6  19.4  69.9  - 46.2  6.3  0.6
Ecuador  DHS  19S7  24.2  62.5  43.7  10.5  0.2
El  Salvador  DHS  1935  26  64.1  36.3  8.1
uatetncb  DHS  1937  29.4  43.3  23.1  9
Mexico  DHS  1987  24.1  66.7  52.1  9.3
Penu  DHS  1991  . 0.9
Peru  DHS  1936  27.7  53.3  51.6  13.1  6.0
Trinidad  and  Tobago  DHS  1937  16.1  74.2  66.1  6.7
tlote on Acce_s: The fraction  of women not uing due to acceu has two definitions,  depending  on the question  in the DHS. Definition  I result fiom fist asking  womne:  *If you
became  pregnant  in the next few weeks,  would you feel happy,  unhappy,  or would  k not mAtter  veay  much?-  then,  of those  that do not repond 'bappy' asking 'What is the main rason
that you an  not  using a method  to avoid pregnancy?' In the list of 13 possible  responses  Is: 'lack of knowledge',  'acceaevailability'.  and  'coats too mucb.- The fraction  not using
due to access  in  of all cumrntly  tmaried wome the faction unhappy  If prenant and rot  using due to one  of these  three  reasons. Definition  2 is the resul of asking  women  who afe not
using and do tOt Intend  to UtC: * What l  the main teason  you do not intend  to use a method?' In addtion to the three acces  easons 'Wants children'  iba possible  (and  generally  most
frequeas)  anwer.59
A second  reason  why "unmet  need" does  not have the large fertility  consequences  one
might  expect  is that a substantial  portion  of "unmet  need' consists  of women  who are currently
pregnant (or amenorrheic)  whose pregnancy  or most recent birth was either mistimed  or
unwanted. These  temporarily  infecund  women  account  for between  one-third  and one-half  of
all "unmet  need"  in Sub-Saharan  African  countries.  The "unmet  need' also  include  a substantial
fraction of  women with demand for spacing, that is,  who want more children but not
immediately.' 3 While  including  these  two  groups  are relevant,  table 10  reports  the total "unmet
need' alongside  the most relevant  group for determining  total completed  fertility  levels, the
fraction  of currently  married  fec-nd women wanting  no more children  who are not using
contraception.  The  fraction  of all "unmet  need"  that consists  of this group  is typically  less  than
a third of all "unmet  need", with a median  fraction  of only 6.5 percent.  For instance,  in
Uganda,  27 percent  of women  are said to have "unmet  need" but only 5 percent  of married
fecund  women  want  no more  children  and are not using  contaception. While  both  the question
of the fertility  impact  of spacing  and the question  of the appropriat treanment  of pregnant  and
amenorrheic  women  are difficult,  it is nonetheless  interesting  to note that large "unmet  need"
figures  ame  consstent  with  very  smanll  nunbers  of  fecund  women  wishing  to  limit  not  using  cntraction.
6a Increased  use  of contraception  for spacing  also may have  some  effect  on ferdlity,  but if
spacing  left total fertility  desires  unchanged  then although  immediate  uptake  of contraception
would  initially  lower  observed  TFR (as women  early in reproductive  careers  began  to space)
over  time this difference  would  be eroded  as older  women  began  having  the children  that were
spaced  previously  (perhaps  not completely  due  to infecundity  before  reaching  the  desired  number
of children). The question  of how to measure  the  fertility  affects  of avoided  births due to
spacing  which  may occur later is difficult,  but it is clear meeting  limiters  demand  is of more
relevance  for fertility.60
Fertility change.  Some argue that the magnitude  and rapidity of the ferdlity transition
in developing  countries  compared to the historical  transition in the now developed  countries  is
a strong  argument for the importance  of familv  planning programs.  Robey et al (1993)  argue
"The differences  between fertility declines in developing countries today and those seen in
Europe may best be explained by  differences in  the  approach to  family planning."  If
contraception or  improved family planning were driving ferility  declines, they should be
accompanied  by a reduction in excess fertility.
But the impressive declines in fertility observed are  due almost entirely to equally
impressive declines in  desired fertlity,  not by reductions in  excess fertility, as  would be
expected if expansion  of contraceptive  access were driving fertility declines.  Only seventeen
countries have complete survey data at two points in  time".  In that sub-sample the actual
fertility decline observed was 1.08 births.  Desired ferdlity (DTFR) fell by a L1=  amount,
1.32 births6'. Excess fertility, the difference  between  TFR and DTFR, decreased in only 6 of
the countries  while rising in eleven. Even in those  six countries where a closer match between
actual and desired fertility contributed to lower fertility, it was generally by a small amount.
Only in Thailand did the reduction in excess ferdlity account for more than a quarter of the
fertility decline.  Even in Mexico, where fertility fell by 1.7 births between 1976 and 1987,
desired fertility  fell by 1.6, while excess fertility  reductions  accounted  for only .1 births.  Since
64  Neither the timing nor the span between the two surveys is uniform across countries.
The period covered is between 7 and 12 years.
6  These are the averages, the median falls in TFR and DTFR are exactly the same, at 1.2.61
DTFR is not affected by contraceptive  access, the increased  excess fertility observed in eleven
of these counties with declining fertility suggests that decreases in desired fertility lead and
cause  subsequent  increases  in contraceptive  use and reductions  in actual ferdlity, rather than vice
versa.
Moreover, most of the intuitive appeal of an argument  based on the speed of the current
demographic  transition is lost once it is recognized that differences  in family planning  are just
one small aspect of differences between tday  and Europe's historical transition.  In  many
developing  countries which experienced  rapid fertility decline everything  happened faster thar.
for the now develuped  countries; mortality  fell faster, incomes  rose faster, education  expanded
more rapidly.  Compare for instance  Thailand with the United Kingdom. According to WPS
and DHS data Thailand's TFR fell from 4.3 in 1975 to 2.2 in 1987, a fifty percent fal  (to near
replacement  levels)  in just twelve years.  By comparison  Great Britain's fertility transition was
very long, with crude birth rates (admittedly  a crude proxy) falling fifty percent only over the
course of fifty years.  However, infant mortality  in Thailand fell 60 percent in 25 years, from
roughly 100  the early 1960's to around 40 by 1985 (United  Nations, 1992). On the other hand,
from a level of 160 in 1800  British infant mortality  took 120 years to faU  sixty percent (and did
not reach 40 until after 1945)".  Thailand's real per capita income has tripled in the thirty
years since 1960, whereas  it took British  per capita national  income  almost ninety years to triple
I  British infant mortality and crude birth rates are for England and Wales and are taken
from Mitchell, 1978.63
information,  discussed  family  planning  needs and offered  a variety  of contraceptive  services (the
pill, condoms, IUDs, injectables). The other half of the Matlab  region received no additional
family  planning  services beyond the usual availability  of government  services.
The project began in October 1977  and achieved  almost immediately  a large increase in
the contraceptive  prevalence rate and a  decrease in  the fertility rate.  Within  18 months
contraceptive  prevalence  in the treatment  area rose from 7 percent to 33 percent (Phillips  et al,
1988) and by 1990 estimates  were that contraceptive  prevalence  in the treatment area was 57
percent compared  to 27 percent in the comparison  area (Koenig,  et al, 1992). Fertility rates also
fell in the treatment area relative to the comparison area.  By 1980 the total fertlity  in the
treatment  area had fallen 24 percent compared to the comparison  area (5.1 versus 6.7), a gap
of 1.6 births that has been roughly maintained since 61.
I
This project proves that family planning activity can have a role in the deterniination  of
fertility.  Does this  experiment refute either  of  our  paper's main  contentions; that  the
responsiveness  of fertility to incremental  changes in family  planning  activity is small, and that
I  The fact that contraceptive  prevalence increased by much more than fertlity fell is due
to greatly  increased  contraceptive  use in the treatment  area for spacing,  marked  by three striking
facts.  First, in 1990  the use of pe,manent contraceptive  methods  (female  or male sterilization).
those preferred  by limiters, was f ct:ually  higher in the comparison  area (9.9 percent) than in the
treatment  area (8.8  percent). Similarly, the use of contraception  among  women wanting  no more
children barely 1 Treased  in the treatment area from 1977 to 1984, from 45.6 percent to 49
percent while  o  .ose wanting  more children use almos' quadrupled  over the same period, from
6.8 percent to 26.3 percent. Third, only 12.4 percent of the increased  contraceptive  use can be
attributed  to increased use among limiters while 57 percent is due to increased use.  by spacers
((Koenig  et al. 1992, Koenig, et al,  1987)62
(between 1855  and 1939)67.  Similarly,  the expansion  of education  has happened  extraordinarily
rapidly in Thailand, the proportion of adult women with no schooling  dropped from 60 percent
to just 20 percent in just twenty five years (Barro and Lee, 1993).
Similarly  rapid improvements  in mortality, income and education are true of other rapid
ferdlity transition cases (e.g. Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan (China)).  Therefore on mere speed
alone it is impossible to attribute any effect to modem contraceptives and their availability.
Studies of the underlying causes of rapid ferdlity transition in these case reveal that attributing
all (or in some cases, even a substantial  fraction) of the fertility decline or its speed to family
planning programs per  se  vastly overstates the  program effect (Schultz,  1987 and  1992,
Hernandez, 1984).
What about the Matlab  data?. Perhaps the most famous controlled  experiment  examining
the effects of family planning  activities  on contraceptive  use and fertility is the Family Planning
and Health Services Project (FPHSP)  carried out in a research station  of the International  Center
for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh  (ICDDR,B) in the Matlab region of Bangladesh.
This project provided half of the villages  in the region (the treatment area) with very intensive
family planning services, including  visits every two weeks to each currently married, fecund
women by a full-time project employee (generally a married, contracepting, well-educated,
female village resident from an influential  family).  This family planning worker presented
67 According to national income figures in Deane and Cole, 1967.  Needless to say there
is some uncertainty, Maddison, 1991, reports GDP per person less than doubled between 1870
and 1938.64
very little of cross country differences  or changes  in fertility are (or are likely to be) explained
by differences  in contraceptive  access or family  planning  programs? No.  The fertility changes
were large not because fertility was particularly  responsive  but because the effort was massive
and expensive.  This program expense makes it unlikely that this degree of effort will be
replicated at a national scale in Bangladesh,  or anywhere.
The FPHSP experiment took "contracepting"  costs from about as high as they could
possibly be and drove them to about  as low as they possibly be, substantially  cheaper than free.
The price of contracepting  has at least six components:  the money cost of the contraceptive
service, the search costs of acquiring  informnation  about contraception  and where to purchase  it,
the time and travel costs to obtain  contraception,  the 'variety constraintw  cost',  the side effects
of contraceptive  use, and, the psychic  costs of using contraception  in the face of perceived  social
or familial disapproval.  Prior to the experiment  many of these costs were very high.  The
Matlab  region is predominantly  Muslim  and most women  observe 'purdah'  involving  substantial
restriction on  women's movements outside the home,  making both  the costs of acquiring
information and the costs of obtaining  contraceptives  dramatically higher than in most other
cultures. Moreover, in 1984  42 per of women  in the treatment area perceived disapproval  from
their husbands or others (DeGraff, 1991).
69 This is the cost to the user of not getting exactly the variety he/she prefers.  This cost
is recognized is the economics literature  on product differentiation.  This may account for a
significant fraction of the additional contraceptive  use, as most of  the additional use in the
treatment  area has been of injectables,  while  in the comparison  area the use is predominantly  the
pill and sterilization  (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1992).65
The program reduced all of these costs to as low a level as possible. Contraceptives  were
provided free avoiding  money costs.  Contraception  was delivered  to the home (except when
requiring  a clinic)  avoiding  travel and time costs. A broad variety  of methods  were offered and
used 70. The recruitment  of educated village women to provide  continuous  (fortnightly)  contact
and support was a deliberate attempt to overcome both the costs of obtaining  contraception in
a traditional  society  and social and familial disapproval 7" and to reduce the suffering from side
effects.  Even for goods provided "free", the user bears all but the money costs, the FPHSP
made contracepting  much cheaper than free.
Given the tremendous  decline in contracepting  costs and truly amazing sustained effort
(an 35 year old woman would by now have received over 300 visits from a family planning
worker) a  fertility decline of  1.5 births  (or about 25  percent) in  Matlab seems perfectly
consistent with all the other evidence (the close link of desired and actual fertlity,  lack of
contraceptive  prevalence  effect on excess fertlity,  small independent  impact  of family planning
effort, low contraceptive  price elasticities, limited effect  of "unmet  need' measures)  that fertility
is substantially  inelastic with respect to costs of contraceptive  access or family planning effort.
We are not arguing fertility is invariant with respect to the cost of contrception, just that it is
'  Only 21 percent of women in 1990 used the pill.  One lesson of the prior contaceptive
supply saturation experiment in Matlab (Contraceptive  Distributive Project) may be the deep
unpopularity  of the pill, especially as opposed to injectables.  Also the Matlab data show a
relatively high rate of switching from one method to another as consumers try a method and
become  dissatisfied,  indicating  a potentially large variety preference  problem.
71  This may be successful.  DeGraff (1991) reports that a woman in the who perceives
disapproval  from her husband or others is 51 percentage  points less likely to use contraception
in the treatment  area but 88 percentage points less likely in the comparison  area.66
sufficiently  inelastic to make cost variations  an unlikely  source for explaining  or causing  major
demographic  changes.
This fertility reduction came at a sufficiently  high cost to make it not replicable either
at national scale or world-wide. Table 11 presents estimates of the cost of the program. The
total costs include many costs not directly related to  the project (such as data collection,
international technical assistance,  and non-service  related overheads).  While it can be argued
these costs should be discounted, the role of international technical assistance was likey
important  in the success  of the project and may  be critical to replicability. Even taking  the "core
service" costs, they amount to over eight dollars  per woman, which in Bangladesh  is 5 percent
of GDP.
Table 10:  Costs of the Matlab (FPHSP)  experiment  and Bangladesh  goverment
expenditures  on family planning in  1985 (in 1992 $).
Cost  Cost per woman  Cost per woman
('000)  aged 15-49 (% of
GDP per  capita)
Total cost  $386.255  $17.27  10.0%
"Core service" cost  $188.718  $8.44  4.9%
Public expenditures  $45,400  $3.38  1.8%
in Bangladesh
Notes:  Based on Simmons, Balk, and Faiz, 1991 and Nag, 1992.  Number of women
15-49 in treatment area is 22,370.  Per capita GDP in 1985 was $150.  All 1985 dollar
figures were transformed to current (1993)  dollars by the US CPI.
The core service program cost  alone is thirty-five  times average  public expenditure  levels
on family planning per married woman of reproductive age for four components  of family67
planning (contraception,  staff training, IEC, and compensation  payments) in Asian countries
(Sanderson and Tan,  1993)fl.  Bangladesh has by far the highest family planning expenditures
in Asia for these four components 73, at .41 percent of GDP and total expenditures  on family
planning  are 1.8% of GDP per MWRA, about a third the Matlab 'core service" program cost.
Worldwide  total expenditures  on family planning (public and private) are about .6 percent of
GDP per capita per woman of childbearing  age (World Bank, 1993)74.  If the Matlab level of
spending  (as a fraction  of GDP 75) were to be achieved worldwide  family  planning  expenditures
would need rise to over $40 billion, an eight to ten fold increase over current levels.
How much  did costs decline? While the "core service' cost reflects the cost of delivering
the additional  services, even thought the additional costs of the total project were not spent
directly on the project they reflect the better design and implementation  of this project, which
may be reflected  in lower contrapppting  costs to users for a given expenditure. Taking the total
72  Sanderson  and Tan (table 4.2) show public family planning related expenditures per
MWRA  for these components  for ten Asian countries (excluding  China). The average level is
.14 percent of GDP per capita.  The staff costs are excluded because of the difficultyl of
accounting  for differences  across countries in the allocation between family planuing  and other
activities.
I  It is worth noting external funding  is 60 percent of Bangladesh's  total public spending on
family  planning  programs, also the highest in Asia.
74  World Bank, 1993 (table 4) estimates  between  4 and 5 billion (in 1988  dollars for family
planning expenditures in  1990 (they use $4 billion).  Taking $5 billion (to be generous)
combined  with 1.04 billion women of reproductive  age and the average developing  country GDP
per capita of $840 (from the World Development Report, 1992).
5  The fraction of GDP is relevant because the major costs of the service are personnel,
whose costs rise roughly  one for one with GDP. A more sophisticated  calculation  could assume
equal costs for international  traded components, but would  come with much the same figures.68
cost decline  to women  versus the government  program to be somewhere  between  2.5 and 5 times
the expenditure  levels elsewhere  in Bangladesh. Calculating  a crude elasticity  with a 25 percent
fall in fertlity suggests  an elasticity  of fertility  with respect to contAcepting  costs of between -
16 and -.063X6.  This number is certainly  consistent  with other results, as seen when expressed
in elasticity  form.  From table 3 the elasticity (at the means) of fertility with respect to PPE is
between -.04 [(.007)+(31/5)] and -.074, with the elasticity with respect to CPV is -.074 or -
061.  These are not of course directly  comparble  as we do not know the elasticity of FPE and
CPV themsleves  with respect to expenditures. The fertility elasticity  with pill prices of -.05 and
the overall price elasticities  of contraceptive  use of around -.1 are also broadly consistent. A
calculation assuming constancy in  percentage changes with elasticities of  -.1  suggests an
exgoenous  doubling of family plaming expenditures  in low income countries excluding China
would reduce ferdlity by about one half a birth per woman7.
Put another way, the cost per birth averted by the program was $180 in 1987 and 120
ment of Bangladesh's GDP per capitaP.  At this cost as a fraction of GDP ber both averted
76  This is just the crude calculation  of the ratio of the percentage fall in fertlity (25 percent)
to the fall in costs (between 150  and 400 percent).
I  Taldng the percentage increase times the elasticity times the actual fertility gives the
figure (e.g.  (l00)*(.l)*(5)/100 =  .5).  We take 5 as the typical TFR of low income countries
he unweighted  average  is 5.9, population  weighted  average is 4.5, the median  is acually over
7  This points up an important  distinction  between costs to a couple of avo.ding  a birth that
is unwanted and the costs through public action of averting a birth.  Use of the fomer  to
estimate the latter is often done, but is completely  erroneous conceptually  and can be wrong
empirically  by orders of magnitude. The contraceptive  cost of avoiding  a birth cannot even be
an approximation  to the costs of averting  addtional  births through family planning  expenditures.69
a doubling of family planring expenditures  would reduce the rate of natural increase by one
tenth of one percentage point (a decline ir  the CBR from 30  to 29)1'.  These are  crude
calculations, most fertility reduction would happen in the poorer of the countries rather than
equiproprtionately  by population  so the average  dollar cost would be lower.  Nevertheless  even
the most optimistic  assumptions  about the likely course of  family planning  expenditures,
independent  variations  (as  opposed  to increases  in response  to increased  demand)  are unlikely
to play a major  role in reducing  ferdlity  levels,  if the Matlab  costs  are any guide'.
Conclusion
The conclusion  that follows  from the evidence  and analysis  presented  is that because
fertility  is principally  determined  by child desires,  contraceptive  access (or cost) or family
planning  effort more generally  are not a dominant,  or  typically  even a  major, factor in
determining  fertility  differences. 8'  In conclusion,  we would like to add five final comments.
?9 Again,  a very crude  calculation  based  on a reduction  of the CBR from 30 to 29 with  a
1990  developing  country  population  of 4,145 million  implies  4.1 million  births averted with
1990  GDP in developing  countries  of $1010  implies  at 120  percent  of GDP per birth averted
implies  increased  expenditures  by $5 billion.
I  Interestingly,  the Simmons,  Balk,  Faiz 1991  article  argues  the Matlab  program  was  mor
cost effective  than the regular  govemment  program  in cost per birth averted. This appears  to
be mainly  because  the government  program  is so ineffective  in averting  births. However,  if this
is the case then the assumptions  about  cost  per birth averted  are optimistic  and hence  the costs
of fertility  reduction  would  be even  higher  at more  typical  levels  of program  effectiveness.
"  We do find  in some  instances  of a statistically  significant  effect  of contraception,  but the
impact is always  empirically  small when  judged by practical  impact or explanatory  power.
Optimists  may  point  to the 3-5  percent  that  contraceptive  supply  does  explain,  as opposed  to our
pessimistic  emphasis  on the 95-97  percent  it does not.70
These comments do  not  follow directly from the evidence presented here but  are  more
speculative  as to broader implications  and suggestive  of future research.
First, some might argue that we are attacldng  a straw man, since no one really believes
that the cost and availability  of contraceptives  is important  for fertlity.  As for what is popularly
believed, we can do no better than quote Paul Kennedy's  recent book (Kennedy, 1993) in which
he summarizes  his view of the settled conventional  wisdom on family planning:
"A detailed proposal for dealing with the demographic  explosion in developing
countries would simply repeat what numerous studies by international agencies
have pointed out: that the only practical way to ensure a decrease in fertility
rates, and thus in population  growth, is to introduce  cheap and reliable forms of
birth control."
We could not have invented a clearer and more articulate statement  of the view we argue is
wrong.
Second, among experts in the field, there has evolved a more subtle view.  Decades of
promoting  contraception  have convinced  many  that supply  is not the only problem. Some would
argue that what we are saying is already well-known,  that is, to achieve  fertility reductions, one
must change desires an  improve contraceptive  access. But we suggest the evidence presented
here shows that it is fertility desires and nQ contraceptive  access that matters.0 2 A low level
of desired fertility appears to be both necessary ad  sufficient for low fertility.  Desire to
I  Of course, it is always true that changing fertility desires ad  increased contraceptive
access cause fertility reductions in the trivial sense that gin and  tonic make you drunk.71
regulate fertility calls forth the requisite level of contraception, either  from the private or
government  sources. In contrast,  an improvement  in contraceptive  access (as distinguished  from
contraceptive use) is  neither sufficient n=r necessary for  large  fertility  reductions.  In
economist's terms, the fact that the quantity  of contraception supplied to users must increase
does not imply that supply must shift.  Of course, if the government pursues policies that
interfere with contraceptive  access and thereby make the supply  of contraception  less responsive
to increased demand, then this will attenuate  the fertility reductions from changing  desires for
children.
Third, since we are asserting that the proposition that contraception is important for
fertility is  both a  widely held belief and is  demonstrably false,  we owe the reader some
explanation as to how this came to be.  Contraception  is an obviously important proximate
determinant of fertility. Fertility  rates and contraceptive  use are strongly negatively  associated
across countries, across households,  and over time. Hence, it is easy to conclude  that variations
in  contraceptive access cause variations  in fertility.  The temptation to infer causation from
association is strong, often overwhelming. In addition, there are conditions in which access
could be a  more important deterninant: if the supply of additional contraception were not
flexible to  meet additional demand or the government imposed conditions that would make
access critical.  Again, usually  these conditions  are not the case.  Finally, if, as many believe,
population  growth is one of the most serious  challenges  facing humankind,  it is tempting  to hope
that something  relatively cheap and easy like subsidizing  contraceptive services could solve the
problem.72
Fourth, even if contraceptive  access has a small effect on ferdlity, this is certainly no
reason for govemments  to limit the availability  of contraception,  and there may yet be valid
reasons for a subsidy.  Just because family planning is of marginal relevance for population
change  does not mean it does not have other beneficial  impacts. Moreover, a reduction in the
focus of family  planning programs on population  growth will allow greater attentiveness  in the
design of contraceptive  supply to other considerations,  such as child and matemal health, the
timing of first births, and the prevention of sexually transmitted  diseases.
Undoubtedly  the expanded availability of modern contraception  has greatly improved
human  welfare. As detailed in the World Development  Report 1993, there are important health
benefits to  contraception through' better timing and spacing of births, independent of any
reduction in overall ferdlity.  Evidence suggests that, ceteris  paribus, children born too early
or  too close together face an  increased risk of  mortality.  Better and cheaper access to
contraception,  especially  of temporary and reversible methods, may allow women to gain these
health  benefits  for themselves  and their children. In many  countries,  preventing  early first births
would not only improve maternal and child health at first birth but also allows women to gain
valuable  educational  and labor force experience  before beginning  child rearing. The experience
of the U.S. shows  that even if the number of total births is not a concem, the timing of the first
birth can have important, lifelong, socioeconomic  implications  for mothers.73
The examination  of actual and desired fertility did not allow us to distinguish  between
ways in which unwanted  births  are avoided. Modern contraception  has also made  it possible  for
people to meet their fertility  goals without  resorting to abortions.  For instance, in the former
Soviet Union fertility is limited  through  widespread recourse to abortions, partially due to the
greater availability  of abortions  than modern contraceptives.
Historical fertility  transitions  often involved reduced coital frequency  (for exam.ple,  late
age  of  marriage, low rates of  marriage, prolonged postpartum abstinence, etc.).  In  the
developing countries the use of non-contraceptive  fertility limitation  has been less and this is a
major benefit of modern contraception. For instance, the birth rate in Sweden and Finland in
1875 was 30.5 and 37 respectively,  partly because mean age at marriage for women was 27.1
and 25.6 (Kumar, 1971)  whereas  contemporary  Egypt or Peru have similar crude birth  rates with
a median age at marriage  of 18.5  and 21.2 respectively. In Mexico, fertlity has fallen  from 6.3
in 1973 to 3.8 in 1986 while age at marriage has barely risen.  In the 1987 DHS survey in
Mexico, women with a secondary  education  reported having sexual relations 40 percent more
frequently than women with no schooling  6.1 versus 4.3 per month), even though their fertility
was less than half (2.5 versus 6.1).  In Taiwan (China), coital frequency increased  during the
same period in which  fertlity fell dramatically  from 4.8 to 2.8 (Sun, Lin, and Freedman, 1978)
and similar increases were observed  ir  .ie  U.S.  in the 1960s (Trussell and Westoff, 1980).
Coital frequency is generally  higher in households  using contraception.  Many recent surveys
have asked whether women have been 'sexually active' in the previous four weeks.  In Peru,
53 percent of those using no contraceptive  method had been sexually active  as against  95 percent74
of those  using the pill; 47 percent and 91 percent in Colombia;  and 59 percent and 86 percent
in Nigeria.
The emergence of AIDS and the expansion  in the sexually  transmitted  diseases (STDs)
generally  introduce  new complications  into decisions  about  contraceptive  mix.  Some methods
particularly  cost effective for fertility limitation  (e.g. female  or male sterilization)  have no effect
on disease  transmission. Condoms, while generally  thought  ineffective  for ferdlity limitation,
save  important  secondary  health benefits for women in inhibiting  STD transmission.
Fifth and finally, we have  focused only on the importance of  desired ferdlity in
explaining  fertility variations and the relatively small independent  role of contraceptive access
(or family  planning  more generally).  This does not imply t1hat  for a variety of economic and
environmental  reasons a reduction of in population  growth  rates may befdesirable,  and even in
some circumstances  critical.  However, since many women in developing  countries currently
perceive  they are better off with large families the best (and perhaps  the only palatable) way to
reduce fertlity  is  to  change the  economic and social conditions that make large  families
desirable. Reducing  ferdlity is best seen as a broad problem of improving women's economic
condition,  women (and children's) health, and women's  role and status  in society. That is a task
altogether  more difficult, but with more promise, than manipulating  contraceptive  supply.
In particular, although this paper has not focused  on the determinants  of desired fertility,
expansion  in female  education appears to be key to fertility  reductions. Cross national evidence75
which separates  the two shows much stronger  effects of female than male education  in reducing
fertility (Schultz, 1993, Subbarao and Raney,  1993, Barro and Lee,  1993b).  Household
evidence  shows  the importance  of female  education,  particularly  primary completion  and beyond,
for reducing  fertlity and through  reduced  fertlity desires. Summers (1992)  shows,  for example,
that increasing  female  education  through  expanded  access in Pakistan would  be an important  and
cost effective means of reducing  fertility.76
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Data Appendix
Table  A.  Actual  feftility  and  various  mnasures  of fertility  demand
|  Average  idel  Desired  |  Percentage  of all  Perentage  of womeo
number  of Childer  TFR  Wonted  TFR  births  that  aem  with 4 living  children
Country  Survey  Ye  TFR  (AINC)  (DTFR)  (WTFR)  wanted  (Bongsafts)  who  want  no more
Africa  .
Benin  WFS  1952  7.3  7.3  7  12.1
Botmm  WFS  1980  6.1  - 6
Bot  ans  DHS  1933  5  4.7  4.1  29.R
Butundi  WFS  1978  7.9  - 7.6  -
Bumndi  DHS  1937  6.7  5.3  5.7  5.6  37  25.2
Caneroon  WFS  197S  6.4  3  6.1  6  94  3
Ghetu  WFS  1980  6.2  6  6  5.6  91  is
Ghana  DHS  1933  6.4  5.3  5.3  5.4  9  25.1
Ivowy  Cor..  WFS  1931  7.2  8.4  7.2  - 3.2
Kenya  WFS  1973  7.9  7.2  7.6  6.7  86  16.1
Kenya  DHS  19S9  6.4  4.4  4.5  49
Lesoetho  WFS  1977  6  6  5.6  4.9  34  26.6
|Lberia  DRS  1916  6.S  6.0  6.3  6  9  23
Manr  DHS  1937  7.01  6.9  7.1  7  93  26.3
Mauritanis  WPS  1974  7.S  3.3  7.1  ,  26.3
Nigeda  DHS  1990  6.01  5.3  16.7
Senepl  WFS  1973  7.1  S.3  6.9  6.9  99  9.0
Senegal  DHS  1936  6.6  6.S  5.6  5.7  91  IS.S83
Sudan  WFS  1979  5.4  6.2  5  4.8  89  16.1
Sudan  DHS  1990  4.6  5.S  . 23.3
Togo  DHS  1981  6.6  5.3  5.1  26.6
Uganda  DHS  1989  7.5  6.5  6.5  17.9
Zimbabwe  DHS  198S  5.2  4.9  4.3  31.8
_  _  _.  .. _  . ~_  . -. _.
Bangladesh  WFS  1976  5.4  4.1  4.6  4.2  79  76.7
Flji  WFS  1974  4.1  4.2  3.6  3.2  3  66.7
Indonesia  WFS  1976  4.3  4.1  4  3.6  e5  57
Indonesia  DHS  1937  3.3  3.2  2.4  - 79.2
Korn  WFS  1974  3.6  3.2  2.8  2.6  7  92
Malaysia  WFS  1974  4.2  4.4  3.3  3.6  85  51.9
Nepal  WFS  1976  6.8  3.0  5.4  4.6  77  5s
Pakinan  WFS  1976  6  4.2  4.3  4.2  75  69
Pakidan  DHS  1991  6.3  4.1  - - - 51.6
Philippines  WFS  197S  5.0  4.4  4.1  - - 63
Sri Lanks  WFS  1975  3.4  3.8  2.9  2.4  72  87
Sd Lanka  DHS  19S7  2.7  3.1  2.2  2.2  84  92.6
Thailand  WFS  1975  4.3  3.7  3.2  2.6  64  81.3
Thailand  DHS  1937  2.2  2.1  2.1  - - 17.7
Vietnam  DHS  19SS  4.5  2.5  - - 80.6
Eaupe,  Middle  East,  and North  Al_
Egypt  IWFS  1930  S  - 3.6  3.3  7  75.3
Egypt  DHS  21933 4.4  j  2.9  2.1  j  T  - 82.184
Jordan  WFS  1976  7.3  6.3  6  5.2  77  38.3
Morcco  WFS  1980  5.5  - 4.4  _  |  44.7
Morceco  DHS  1987  4.6  3.7  3.3  3.2  76  58.8
Potuapl  WFS  I980  2.4  23  1.9  2  95  96.2
Syia  WFS  1978  7.5  6.1  63  5.5  78  44.5
Tunisia  WFS  1978  5.5  4.1  4.1  3.8  74  _
Taiiab  DHS  1938  4.1  3.5  2.9  - 78
Trey  WFS  197  43  3.03  3  79  82.6
Yeams AR  WFS  1979  *.5  3.5  8.2  24.7
L~adh America ad  doe Caibber  ___  _____
clbvi.  DHS  1989  4.9  2.6  2.8  35.8
Bhll  DHS  1986  33  2.3  2.2  2.2  71  86.9
Comd,l  WFS  1976  4.6  4  3.4  2.7  62  79
Colombia  DHS  1966  3.1  2.7  2.1  2  61  89.8
Colon"  DHS  1990  2.9  2.6  893
Coesa  Rkc  WFS  1976  3.5  4.7  3  3  88  68.4
Dod,kanRepubfe  WFS  1975  5.2  4.7  3.8  33  68  69.6
|  uDouwca"  RoI.b5o  DHS  1986  3.6  3.4  2.6  2.5  75  37.6
DoeinkaRvhbfl  DNS  1991  33  3.1  - - 95.9
Ecuador  WFS  1979  53  3.0  4.1  3.4  69  68
ECU|do  DHS  1987  43  2.5  2.9  2A  6  80.7
El Slvador  DHS  1985  4.4  3.6  _  77.9
Gastamal  DHS  1987  5.6  4.2  4.5  __62.1
Ouyam  WFS  1975  4.4  4.6  3.8  3.1  74  6085
Hold  WFS  1977  5.6  3.6  4.3  3.4  65  6t
Jarmica  WFS  1976  3.7  4.2  3.4  2.9  71  54
Mexico  WFS  1976  5.7  4.4  4.5  3.5  65  69.4
DHS  1987  4  3  2.9  . 84.8
Mexico
Panam  WFS  1976  4.2  4.3  3.9  3  75  31.7
Parauay  WFS  1979  5  5.2  4.5  4  83  41.2
Peru  WFS  1973  5.3  3.3  3.5  3  61  74.2
Pens  DHS  19S6  4.1  3.6  2.3  2.1  56  35.9
Pem  DHS  1991  3.5  2.5  - - _9.1
Trndad  A Tobago  WFS  1977  2.5  3.S  2.5  2.6  87  74.3
Triniad & Tobago  DHS  19S1  3  2.9  2.2  2.2  75  86.5
Vcneaele  WFS  1977  4.3  4.2  3.6  2.9  63  74.3
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